United States District Court, D. South Dakota, Southern Division
1915A SCREENING AND ORDER DISMISSING
ROBERTO A. LANGE, UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE.
Loren Fallis, filed a pro se civil rights law suit under 42
U.S.C. § 1983. Doc. 1. He filed a motion for leave to
proceed in forma pauperis and has provided the court with his
prisoner trust account. Docs. 3, 5. Fallis's complaint
alleges claims of malicious prosecution against the
defendants. Doc. 1 at 2.
Motion to Proceed In Forma Pauperis
filed a motion to proceed in forma pauperis, Doc. 3, and a
prisoner trust account report, Doc. 5, showing that he
presently has a balance of $20.64. Doc. 5 at 1. His average
monthly balance for the past six months has been $5.87.
Id. Under the Prison Litigation Reform Act (PLRA), a
prisoner who "brings a civil action or files an appeal
in forma pauperis . . . shall be required to pay the full
amount of a filing fee." 28 U.S.C. § 1915(b)(1).
'"When an inmate seeks pauper status, the only issue
is whether the inmate pays the entire fee at the initiation
of the proceeding or over a period of time under an
installment plan.'" Henderson v. Norris,
129 F.3d 481, 483 (8th Cir. 1997) (quoting McGore v.
Wrigglesworth, 114 F.3d 601, 604 (6th Cir. 1997)). The
initial partial filing fee that accompanies an installment
plan is calculated according to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(b)(1),
which requires a payment of 20 percent of the greater of:
(A) the average monthly deposits to the prisoner's
(B) the average monthly balance in the prisoner's account
for the 6-month period immediately preceding the filing of
the complaint or notice of appeal.
on the information regarding Fallis's prisoner trust
account and rather than requiring an initial filing fee of
just $4, the court grants Fallis leave to proceed in forma
pauperis and waives the initial partial filing fee.
See 28 U.S.C. § 1915(b)(4) ("In no event
shall a prisoner be prohibited from bringing a civil action
... for the reason that the prisoner has no assets and no
means by which to pay the initial partial filing fee.").
However, this does not relieve Fallis from his obligation to
pay the filing fee over time for this § 1983 case. In
order to pay his filing fee, Fallis must "make monthly
payments of 20 percent of the preceding month's income
credited to the prisoner's account." 28 U.S.C.
§ 1915(b)(2). The statute places the burden on the
prisoner's institution to collect the additional monthly
payments and forward them to the court as follows:
After payment of the initial partial filing fee, the prisoner
shall be required to make monthly payments of 20 percent of
the preceding month's income credited to the
prisoner's account. The agency having custody of the
prisoner shall forward payments from the prisoner's
account to the clerk of the court each time the amount in the
account exceeds $ 10 until the filing fees are paid.
28 U.S.C. § 1915(b)(2). The installments will be
collected pursuant to this procedure. The Clerk of Court will
send a copy of this order to the appropriate financial
official at Fallis's institution. Fallis remains
responsible for the entire filing fee, as long as he is a
prisoner. See In re Tyler, 110 F.3d 528, 529-30 (8th
Allegations of Fallis's Complaint
claims that he was subjected to malicious prosecution by the
defendants and malfeasance by the defense attorney. Doc. 1 at
2. He believes that the State proceeded against him without
an indictment and the "[d]efense and State are with
knowledge of the suicide of [his] co-defendant," whom he
claims is "most likely [the] one that holds guilt."
Id. Fallis has not filed a petition for habeas
corpus under 28 U.S.C. § 2254, but instead a § 1983
suit requesting damages for pain and suffering in the amount
of $250, 000. Id. at 2-3. He notes that he is suing
all of the defendants in their official and individual
capacities. Id. at 2. Further, he claims to have
exhausted all available administrative remedies. Id.
Screening and Dismissal Standards
"[c]ourt must assume as true all facts well pleaded in
the complaint." Estate of Rosenberg v.
Crandell, 56 F.3d 35, 36 (8th Cir. 1995). Civil rights
and pro se complaints must be liberally construed.
Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89, 94 (2007);
Bediako v. Stein Mart, Inc., 354 F.3d 835, 839 (8th
Cir. 2004). Even with this liberal construction, "a pro
se complaint must contain specific facts supporting its
conclusions." Martin v. Sargent, 780 F.2d 1334,
1337 (8th Cir. 1985); see also Ellis v. City of
Minneapolis, 518 Fed.Appx. 502, 504 (8th Cir. 2013).
Civil rights complaints cannot be merely conclusory.
Davis v. Hall, 992 F.2d 151, 152 (8th Cir. 1993);
Parker v. Porter, 221 Fed.Appx. 481, 482 (8th Cir.
complaint "does not need detailed factual allegations
... [but] requires more than labels and conclusions, and a
formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of action
will not do." Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550
U.S. 544, 555 (2007). If a complaint does not contain these
bare essentials, dismissal is appropriate. Beavers v.
Lockhart,755 F.2d 657, 663 (8th Cir. 1985).
Twombly requires that a complaint's
"[f]actual allegations must be enough to raise a right
to relief above the speculative level on the assumption that
all the allegations in the complaint are true."
Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555 (footnote and citation
omitted); see also Abdullah v. Minnesota, 261
Fed.Appx. 926, 927 (8th Cir. 2008) (noting that a complaint
must contain either direct or inferential allegations
regarding all material elements necessary to sustain recovery
under some viable legal theory). Under 28 U.S.C. §
1915A, the court must screen prisoner complaints and dismiss
them if they are "(1) frivolous, malicious, or ...