United States District Court, D. South Dakota, Central Division
OPINION AND ORDER GRANTING IN PART MOTION TO SUPPRESS
AND ADOPTING REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION
ROBERTO A. LANGE UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE
Defendant
Boyer Thomas LaForge, Jr. made statements to FBI Agent
Benjamin Plante on February 4, 2019, while in tribal custody
and then again on April 19, 2019, while being transported to
a county jail. He moved to suppress both statements, relying
on Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966), and the
Fifth and Sixth Amendments. The government did not oppose
excluding the April 19 statements as substantive evidence,
conceding that LaForge had previously invoked his rights to
remain silent and to counsel. Magistrate Judge Mark A. Moreno
agreed that the April 19 statements are inadmissible as
substantive evidence but recommended denying LaForge's
motion in all other respects. LaForge has now filed
objections to the report and recommendation.
This
Court reviews a report and recommendation under the statutory
standards found in 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1), which provides
in relevant part that "[a] judge of the [district] court
shall make a de novo determination of those portions of the
report or specified proposed findings or recommendations to
which objection is made." However, "[i]n the
absence of an objection, the district court is not required
'to give any more consideration to the magistrate's
report than the court considers appropriate.'"
United States v. Murrillo-Figueroa, 862 F.Supp.2d
863, 866 (N.D. Iowa 2012) (quoting Thomas v. Arn.
474 U.S. 140, 150 (1985)). Having conducted a de novo review
of those portions of the report and recommendation to which
LaForge objects, this Court adopts the report and
recommendation.
I.
February 4, 2019 Statements
At
approximately 3:00 p.m. on February 4, 2019, tribal police
arrested LaForge on allegations of rape, domestic abuse,
kidnapping, and public intoxication. T. 39-40, 52; Ex. A. The
police booked LaForge into the tribal jail and placed him in
the detox tank because he refused to take a PBT. T. 58. Agent
Plante interviewed LaForge at the tribal jail at around 9:40
p.m., over six hours after LaForge was taken into tribal
custody. Ex. 3; T. 13, 19. Agent Plante read LaForge his
Miranda rights from an advice-of-rights form before
asking him any questions. Ex. 2 at 1:34- 2:20; Ex. 3; T.
13-14. LaForge. Ex. 2 at 1:34-2:20; Ex. 3; T. 13-14. LaForge
read the consent section of the form aloud (though not word
for word) and signed the section in Agent Plante's
presence. T. 13-14; Ex. 2 at 1:34-3:15; Ex. 3. Agent Plante
spoke with LaForge for just over 50 minutes. Ex. 2.
LaForge
argues that his Miranda waiver was ineffective
because he was intoxicated. He also claims that his
intoxication and Agent Plante's deceitful questioning
rendered his statements involuntary. Judge Moreno rejected
both of these arguments. Citing LaForge's receipt of
Miranda warnings, the lack of any police coercion, and
LaForge's conduct during the interview, Judge Moreno
concluded that LaForge's statements were voluntary. See
Dickerson v. United States, 530 U.S. 428, 444 (2000)
("[C]ases in which a defendant can make a colorable
argument that a self-incriminating statement was
'compelled' despite the fact that the law enforcement
authorities adhered to the dictates of Miranda are
rare." (quoting Berkemer v. McCarty, 468 U.S.
420, 433 n.20 (1984))); United States v. LeBrun. 363
F.3d 715, 724 (8th Cir. 2004) (en banc) (discussing standard
for determining whether a statement was voluntary). He also
found that LaForge had knowingly, voluntarily, and
intelligently waived his Miranda rights because,
among other reasons, LaForge signed a form stating that he
understood his rights and did not seem intoxicated during the
interview. See Colorado v. Spring. 479 U.S. 564,
573-74 (1987) (setting forth standard for knowing and
voluntary waiver or Miranda rights); North
Carolina v. Butler, 441 U.S. 369, 373 (1979) ("An
express written or oral statement of waiver of the right to
remain silent or of the right to counsel is usually strong
proof of the validity of that waiver. . ..").
This
Court agrees with Judge Moreno's factual findings and
legal conclusions. The objections LaForge now makes to these
conclusions were, in large part, fully addressed by Judge
Moreno. The only specific objection LaForge makes is to Judge
Moreno's finding that LaForge did not exhibit any indicia
of intoxication during the interview. LaForge points to a
tribal police officer's testimony that LaForge smelled
like alcohol when he was arrested around 3:00 p.m.; testimony
that LaForge said he didn't understand his rights when
tribal officers read them aloud while arresting him; and
testimony from a tribal correctional officer that he believed
LaForge was intoxicated when he led LaForge from the detox
tank to meet with Agent Plante.
This
testimony does not establish that LaForge's
Miranda waiver was invalid or that his statements
were involuntary. First, LaForge was in custody, without
access to alcohol, for over six hours before Agent Plante
interviewed him at 9:40 p.m. The arresting officer's
testimony about LaForge's condition at 3:00 p.m. is of
limited relevance to determining LaForge's condition more
than six hours later. Second, although the correctional
officer believed LaForge was intoxicated, Agent Plante, whom
Judge Moreno found credible, testified that LaForge did not
exhibit any signs of intoxication by 9:40 p.m., T. 12, 14-16,
and seemed to understand his rights, T. 14. More importantly,
LaForge's conduct during the interview is plainly
inconsistent with being so intoxicated that he was incapable
of making an informed decision. LaForge engaged in a rational
and coherent dialogue with Agent Plante. He recalled events
from the previous day; insisted that the sex between him and
the alleged victim was consensual and that he never assaulted
her; accused the alleged victim of lying, infidelity, and
drug use; and recognized that Agent Plante was trying to get
him to confess. Ex. 2. In sum, even if LaForge had some
lingering effect from ingesting alcohol more than six hours
before his statements, that would not be enough to overcome
the government's strong evidence that his waiver was
valid, and his statements were voluntary. See United
States v. Contreras, 372 F.3d 974, 977-78 (8th Cir.
2004) (upholding conclusion that a suspect who used
methamphetamine the night before and marijuana the day he
waived his rights consented voluntarily because police
officers testified that he "appeared sober and in
control of his faculties"); United States v.
Turner, 157 F.3d 552, 555-56 (8th Cir. 1998) (finding
that the defendant's conduct established that his waiver
was knowing and voluntary even though he had a low-average IQ
and was under the influence of PCP).
II.
April 19, 2019 Statements
On
April 19, 2019, Agent Plante drove LaForge from the tribal
jail to the Hughes County Jail. Before starting the trip,
Agent Plante activated his recording device and read LaForge
his Miranda rights. Ex. 1. LaForge made some
statements in response to Agent LaPlante's questioning.
Although the government consented to these statements being
inadmissible as substantive evidence, Judge Moreno found that
they were voluntary and therefore could be used for
impeachment.
LaForge
objects to this conclusion but does not specify any
particular grounds for doing so. This Court overrules
LaForge's objection for the reasons explained in the
report and recommendation. In short, nothing about the April
19, 2019 interview comes close to suggesting that
LaForge's statements were "extracted by threats,
violence, or express or implied promises sufficient to
overbear [LaForge's] will and critically impair his
capacity for self-determination." LeBrun, 363
F.3d at 724 (citation omitted). Because LaForge's
statements were voluntary, the government may use them to
impeach him.
III.
Conclusion
For the
reasons stated above, it is hereby
ORDERED
that the Report and Recommendation, Doc. 52, is ...