United States District Court, D. South Dakota, Western Division
ORDER DISMISSING MOTIONS FOR PRELIMINARY
Lawrence L. Piersol, United States District Judge
Holli Lundahl is a pro se litigant and has alleged claims
under the Equal Credit Opportunity Act, the Federal Housing
Act, Section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act, the "[E]qual
[Protection [A]ct under the class theory pursuant to
Village of Willowbrook v. Olech," and Ex Parte
Young. Docket 1 at 1. Lundahl filed three separate
"emergency" motions for "permanent
injunction." Dockets 4, 9, and 17. These motions
(Dockets 4, 9, and 17) are denied for the reasons stated
preliminary injunction is an extraordinary remedy."
Roudachevski v. All-American Care Ctrs., Inc., 648
F.3d 701, 705 (8th Cir. 2011) (citation omitted); see also
Hughbanks v. Dooley, 788 F.Supp.2d 988, 992 (D.S.D.
2011). "The burden of proving that a preliminary
injunction should be issued rests entirely with the
movant." Goff v. Harper, 60 F.3d 518, 520 (8th
Cir. 1995). "The burden on the movant 'is a heavy
one, where, as here, granting the preliminary injunction will
give [the movant] substantially the relief it would obtain
after a trial on the merits.'" College Craft
Cos. v. Perry, 1995 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 19732, at *25 (D.
Minn. 1995) (quoting Sanborn Mfg. v. Campbell
Hausfeld/Scott Fetzer Co., 997 F.2d 484, 486 (8th Cir.
a preliminary injunction should issue involves consideration
of (1) the threat of irreparable harm to the movant; (2) the
state of the balance between this harm and the injury that
granting the injunction will inflict on other parties
litigant; (3) the probability that movant will succeed on the
merits; and (4) the public interest." Dataphase
Sys., Inc. v. CL Sys., Inc., 640 F.2d 109, 113 (8th Cir.
1981) (en banc). The Eighth Circuit held that" 'the
failure to show irreparable harm is, by itself, a sufficient
ground upon which to deny a preliminary
injunction.'" Adam-Mellang v. Apartment Search,
Inc., 96 F.3d 297, 299 (8th Cir. 1996) (quoting
Gelco Corp. v. Coniston Partners, 811 F.2d 414, 418
(8th Cir. 1987)).
"a party must show that the harm is certain and great
and of such imminence that there is a clear and present need
for equitable relief." Iowa Utils. Bd. v. Fed.
Commc'ns Comm'n, 109 F.3d 418, 425 (8th Cir.
1996). Because Lundahl has filed pro se, the claims will be
liberally construed. See Erickson v. Pardus, 551
U.S. 89, 94 (2007). Even with this construction, "a pro
se complaint must contain specific facts supporting its
conclusions." Martin v. Sargent, 780 F.2d 1334,
1337 (8th Cir. 1985); Ellis v. City of Minneapolis,
518 Fed.Appx. 502, 504 (8th Cir.2013).
reviewing Lundahl's motions for permanent injunction in
Dockets 4 and 9 it is noted that these motions are virtually
the same. The only differences in these 81 (Docket 9) and 82
(Docket 4) page motions are the titles, a different
introduction paragraph in Docket 9, and an additional
sentence in Docket 4. Furthermore, this Court notes that
Dockets 4 and 9 mirror the "General Allegations and
Argument" sections (a total of fourteen pages) of
Lundahl's initial complaint. Compare Dockets 4 and 9 to
alleges in Dockets 4 and 9 that "SELLERS have now
threatened to back out of this deal irrespective that
Plaintiff has expended more than $10, 000 in improvements on
the seller's property through third persons based on the
fraudulent lulling and fid[u]ciary fraud of the
Defendants." Dockets 4 at 13 and 9 at 14. Lundahl has
not specifically addressed any of the factors set out by
Dataphase. This Court cannot properly consider a
preliminary/permanent injunction with the facts asserted in
Dockets 4 and 9 because they simply mirror the initial
complaint and do not articulate the Dataphase factors.
Therefore, Lundahl's motions (Dockets 4 and 9) are
Court must now address Lundahl's third motion for
permanent injunction. Docket 17. In Docket 17, Lundahl moves
for a permanent injunction because:
[d]efendants Julie Gross and the State of South Dakota Office
of Rural Development have wholly failed to file any answer or
otherwise respond in any manner to either Plaintiffs
Complaint or Plaintiffs Motion for an Emergency Permanent
Injunction. . .. THEREBY CONCEDING TO SAME AS A MATTER OF
FACT AND LAW.
Docket 17 at 2. Lundahl alleges that "[a]n example of
the urgency is shown by the Homestart Plus grant which
program permanently expired on December 31, 2018 unless a
reservation number was issued prior to that date and the
reservation is utilized before February 12, 2019. See gmail
attached hereto as exhibit 1." Docket 17, at 2. The
attachment that Lundahl refers to does not show that the
'Homestart Plus program is permanently expired-none of
the attachments r> entered with this motion show this.
the possibility of losing a loan may constitute irreparable
harm however Lundahl fails to allege facts that show that
this harm is certain (no facts showing that Lundahl will
receive the loan as a number of party's are involved).
Moreover, Lundahl fails to assert and support the Dataphase
factors. Lundahl fails to: (1) balance the harm that not
granting the preliminary injunction would cause to her and
the injury of granting this would cause the defendants; (2)
show the likelihood that Lundahl will succeed on the merits;
and (3) the public's interest in granting a preliminary
injunction. Although this Court will liberally construe
Lundahl's filings, there must be present arguments to
Court, will not be issuing sanctions at this time, however,
the Court would like to put Lundahl on notice that a mirror
image of the initial complaint in further pleadings may be
seen as an improper purpose and an unnecessary delay which
could subject Lundahl to sanctions. Under Federal Rule of
Civil Procedure 11 "[o]n its own, the court; may order
[a].. . party to show cause why conduct ...