United States District Court, D. South Dakota, Western Division
LAWRENCE L. PIERSOL JUDGE
Logan Lundahl and Holli Lundahl ("plaintiffs")
filed a pro se action against defendants and requested leave
of in forma pauperis, which was later granted. Dockets 1, 2,
3, and 15. In their amended complaint the plaintiffs allege:
(1) Violations of the Federal Racketeering Act[;] ... (2)
Violations of the Fair Housing Amendments Act . . . and its
retaliation provisions[;] ... (3) The Federal Computer Fraud
and Abuse Act[;] . . . (4) violation] and conspiracy to
violate the Federal Civil Rights Act; ... (5) Prospective
Injunctive and declaratory relief under the Ex Parte Young
Doctrine; (6) for Supplemental jurisdiction over Plaintiffs
state law claims for (a) false arrest/false imprisonment; (b)
abuse of process; (c) Malicious prosecution; (d) slander and
libel under South Dakota law; (e) Constructive fraud and
deceit; (f) Breach of Unfair Trade Practices in Utah and
South Dakota; (g) criminal and civil conspiracy [;] [and] (h)
tortious interference with Plaintiffs economic advantages[.]
27 at 1-2, Motions pending before this Court are Dockets 31,
34, 36, 41, 45, 55, 63, and 88. Each of the motions in
Dockets 31, 34, 36, and 41 include a motion to dismiss due to
lack of personal jurisdiction over the prospective defendant.
This Court grants the motions to dismiss due to lack of
personal jurisdiction in Dockets 31, 34, 36, and 41.
Therefore, any remaining motions in those dockets have become
moot. Dockets 31, 34, 36, and 41. The Court grants the
motions to dismiss due to lack of personal jurisdiction
because of the rationale set out below. Furthermore, motions
in Docket 45 (Defendant Lilia Chavarin's motion to
join... motions to dismiss), Docket 55 (Defendant, American
Modern Insurance Group's motion to join the motion in
Docket 47) and Docket 63 (First American Title Co.'s
motion to join motion in Docket 47) have now become moot.
Plaintiffs motion to amend in Docket 88 was untimely filed
and therefore the motion is denied.
Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(2) regarding lack of personal
jurisdiction "permits the district court "to notice
a jurisdictional challenge 'at any time during the
pendency of the proceedings.'" Waldner v. N. Am.
Truck & Trailer, Inc., 277 F, R.D. 401, 411-12
(D.S.D. 2011) (quoting United States v. Patton, 309
F.3d 1093, 1094 (8th Cir. 2002)). "The party asserting
personal jurisdiction bears the burden of establishing a
prima facie case, and the burden does not shift to the party
challenging jurisdiction." Nichols v. MMIC Ins.
Inc., 68 F.Supp.3d 1067, 1071 (D.S.D. 2014); see
Epps v. Stewart Info. Servs. Corp., 327 F.3d 642, 647
(8th Cir. 2003).
allege that this forum has personal jurisdiction over the
defendants under 18 U.S.C. § 1965 a Racketeer Influenced
and Corrupt Organizations ("RICO") statute. The
Eighth Circuit has not addressed the "bounds of personal
jurisdiction under" 18 U.S.C. § 1965.
Waldner, 277 F.R.D. at 412. However, this Court has
adopted the narrower view of the Second Circuit regarding 18
U.S.C. § 1965. Id; PT United Can Co. v. Crown Cork
& Seal Co., 138 F.3d 65, 71 (2dCir. 1998).;
Second Circuit noted that 18 U.S.C. § 1965 must be read
in its entirety. PT United, 138 F.3d at 71. Section
[D]oes not provide for nationwide personal jurisdiction over
every defendant in every civil RICO case, no matter where the
defendant is found. First § 1965(a) grants personal
jurisdiction over an initial defendant in a civil RICO case
to the district court for the district in which that person
resides, has an agent, or transacts his or her affairs. In
other words, a civil RICO action can only be brought in a
district court where personal jurisdiction based on minimum
contacts is established to at least one defendant.
Id. Furthermore, to establish personal jurisdiction
over the "other parties" there must be a showing
that the "ends of justice so require." Id.
Court had adopted the Second Circuit's test to determine
whether personal jurisdiction is found under 18 U.S.C. §
1965: "(1) [whether] the district court has traditional
personal jurisdiction based?on minimum contacts
analysis over at least one defendant; and (2) [whether] the
district court has personal jurisdiction over non-resident
defendants who are alleged co conspirators if the 'ends
of justice' require the court to have this
jurisdiction." Waldner, 277 F.R.D. at 412;
see PT United, 138 F.3d at 71-72; see also
Butcher's Union Local No. 498 v. SDC Inv. Inc., 788
F.2d 535, 53R (9th Cir. 1986).
Waldner, this Court found that there was personal
jurisdiction under both prongs set forth by the adopted test.
The first prong was successful because "a number of
defendants. . . [were] headquartered or incorporated in South
Dakota, meet[ing] the minimum contacts analysis. Under the
second prong, the 'ends of justice' are met if the
action is brought 'where suits are normally expected to
be brought." Waldner, 277 F.R.D. at 412.;
(quoting PT United Can, 138 F.3d at 71-71.).
Moreover, "Congress has expressed a preference in §
1965 to avoid, where possible, haling defendants into far
flung fora.'" Id. In Waldner, this
Court reasoned that because many defendants were domiciled in
South Dakota and the majority were located in Iowa or
Minnesota then it was foreseeable they would be brought to
suit in South Dakota. Waldner, 277 F.R.D. at 412.
plaintiffs have filed their claim pro se, it will be
liberally construed. See Erickson v. Pardus, 551
U.S. 89, 94 (2007). Even with this construction, "a pro
se complaint must contain specific facts supporting its
conclusions." Martin v. Sargent,780 F.2d 1334,
1337 (8th Cir. ...