United States District Court, D. South Dakota, Southern Division
JOSEPH R. FLYING HORSE, Plaintiff,
JAMES HANSEN, DOC PAROLE AGENT, SUED IN HIS OFFICIAL AND INDIVDUAL CAPACITIES; DOUG CLARK, DOC SUPERVISING PAROLE AGENT, SUED IN HIS OFFICIAL AND INDIVDUAL CAPACITIES; KRISTA BAST, SDSP MANAGER, SUED IN HER OFFICIAL AND INDIVDUAL CAPACITIES; SETH HUGHES, SDSP UNIT COORDINATOR, SUED IN HIS OFFICIAL AND INDIVDUAL CAPACITIES; DARIN YOUNG, SDSP WARDEN, OF THE SOUTH DAKOTA STATE PENITENTIARY, SUED IN HIS OFFICIAL AND INDIVDUAL CAPACITIES; DENNY KAEMINGK, DOC SECRETARY OF CORRECTIONS, SUED IN HIS OFFICIAL AND INDIVDUAL CAPACITIES; MIRANDA WARD, SDSP MANAGER, SUED IN HER OFFICIAL AND INDIVIDUAL CAPACITIES; RILEY DEGROOT, SDSP MANAGER, SUED IN HIS OFFICIAL AND INDIVIDUAL CAPACITIES; TROY PONTO, SDSP ASSOCIATE WARDEN, SUED IN HIS OFFICIAL AND INDIVIDUAL CAPACITIES; DARIK BEIBER, SDSP UNIT MANAGER, SUED IN HIS OFFICIAL AND INDIVIDUAL CAPACITIES; VAL MCGOVERN, BOARD STAFF, SUED IN HER OFFICIAL AND INDIVIDUAL CAPACITIES; STACY COLE, BOARD STAFF SUED, IN HER OFFICIAL AND INDIVIDUAL CAPACITIES; KAYLA STUCKY, BOARD STAFF, SUED IN HIS OFFICIAL AND INDIVIDUAL CAPACITIES; ASHLEY MCDONALD, DOC ATTORNEY, SUED IN HIS OFFICIAL AND INDIVIDUAL CAPACITIES; SOUTH DAKOTA DEPARTMENT OF CORRECTIONS, SOUTH DAKOTA BOARD OF PARDONS AND PAROLES, MARK SMITH, JENNIFER ARGUETA, MARY BURGGRAAF, CATHY SOLMA, KAY NIKOLAS, KENNETH ALBERS, PAIGE WILBUR BOCK, REVEREND PATRICIA WHITE HORSE-CARDS, TIM GROSS, JC SMITH, AMBER STEVENS, DA FITZHUGH, MELISSA MATURAN, HUNTER SUMMERS, Defendants.
ORDER GRANTING DEFENDANTS MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT
AND DISMISSING MISCELANEOUS OTHER MOTIONS
E. SCHREIER UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE
Joseph R. Flying Horse, was an inmate at the South Dakota
State Penitentiary in Sioux Falls. He filed this lawsuit
under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Docket 1. The court screened
Flying Horse's complaint under 28 U.S.C. § 1915A and
found that he stated a Fourteenth Amendment and a First
Amendment claim against several defendants. Dockets 27, 90.
Defendants now move for summary judgment based on qualified
immunity. Docket 152. Flying Horse resists the motion for
summary judgment and filed several other miscellaneous
motions. Dockets 174, 158, 193, 195, 197, 203, 215.
the evidence in the light most favorable to Flying Horse, as
the non-moving party, the facts are:
17, 2016, Flying Horse was arrested and charged in Pennington
County for unauthorized possession of a controlled drug or
substance. Docket 156 ¶ 4. Because Flying Horse was on
parole at the time of the arrest, Parole Officer James Hansen
placed a parole hold on Flying Horse. Id.
parole officer, Hansen can order Flying Horse to be detained
for five business days. Id. ¶ 5. Hansen's
supervisor can extend the detainer for an additional five
business days. Id. After the expiration of the
second five business days, the Executive Director for Parole
Services, or his designee, can issue an extended detainer for
up to 90 days. Id.
1, 2016, the charges against Flying Horse were dismissed.
Id. ¶ 4. Once the charges were dropped, the
parole hold took effect. Id. The Pennington County
States Attorney's office informed Hansen that they
intended to refile charges. Id. ¶ 6.
7, 2016, Hansen asked Flying Horse if he would agree to a
voluntary 30-day detainer extension and Flying Horse refused
to sign the consent form. Id. On June 8, 2016, Executive
Director for Parole Services Doug Clark issued a 60-day
extended detainer without Flying Horse's signature.
Id. ¶ 7. This detainer took effect on June 15,
August 11, 2016, Flying Horse's case manager asked Flying
Horse to sign documents agreeing to a transfer to the
Community Transition Program (CTP). Id. ¶ 9.
The case manager also asked Flying Horse to sign a 30-day
extended detainer. Id. Flying Horse refused to sign
both. Id. As a result, Clark approved an additional
30-day extended detainer without Flying Horse's
September 13, 2016, Flying Horse's case manager asked
Flying Horse to sign documents agreeing to transfer to the
CTP and a 30-day extended detainer. Id. ¶ 10.
Flying Horse refused to sign both. Id. Brad
Lewandowski, the designee of Clark, approved an additional
30-day extended detainer without Flying Horse's
Flying Horse refused to accept the parole plan of transfer to
the CTP, Hansen submitted a violation report on September 14,
2016 and a warrant was issued. Id. ¶ 11. On
September 15, 2016, the extended detainer was canceled.
January 11, 2017, the South Dakota Board of Pardons and
Paroles conducted a parole violation hearing regarding Flying
Horse. Id. ¶ 13. The Board decided to revoke
Flying Horse's parole. Id. ¶ 14. On January
26, 2017, Flying Horse appealed. Id. ¶ 15.
filings must be liberally construed. Erickson v.
Pardus, 551 U.S. 89, 94 (2007) (citation omitted). Even
with this construction, “a pro se [filing] must contain
specific facts supporting its conclusions.” Martin
v. Sargent, 780 F.2d 1334, 1337 (8th Cir. 1985); see
also Ellis v. City of Minneapolis, 518 Fed.Appx. 502,
504 (8th Cir. 2013). Summary judgment on all or part of a
claim is appropriate when the movant “shows that there
is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant
is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.”
Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(a); see also In re Craig, 144 F.3d
593, 595 (8th Cir. 1998). The moving party can meet its
burden by presenting evidence that there is no dispute of
material fact or that the nonmoving party has not presented
evidence to support an element of its case on which it bears
the ultimate burden of proof. Celotex Corp. v.
Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322-23 (1986).
the moving party has met this burden, “[t]he nonmoving
party may not ‘rest on mere allegations or denials, but
must demonstrate on the record the existence of specific
facts which create a genuine issue for trial.' ”
Mosley v. City of Northwoods, 415 F.3d 908, 910 (8th
Cir. 2005) (quoting Krenik v. Cty. of Le Sueur, 47
F.3d 953, 957 (8th Cir. 1995)). “Further, ‘the
mere existence of some alleged factual dispute between the
parties is not sufficient by itself to deny summary judgment.
. . . Instead, the dispute must be outcome determinative
under prevailing law.' ” Id. at 910-11
(quoting Get Away Club, Inc. v. Coleman, 969 F.2d
664, 666 (8th Cir. 1992)). The facts, and inferences drawn
from those facts, are “viewed in the light most