Searching over 5,500,000 cases.


searching
Buy This Entire Record For $7.95

Download the entire decision to receive the complete text, official citation,
docket number, dissents and concurrences, and footnotes for this case.

Learn more about what you receive with purchase of this case.

Maday v. Dooley

United States District Court, D. South Dakota, Southern Division

June 7, 2018

STANLEY J. MADAY, Plaintiff,
v.
BOB DOOLEY, CHIEF WARDEN AT MIKE DURFEE STATE PRISON, INDIVIDUAL AND OFFICIAL CAPACITY; DENNIS KAEMINGK, SECRETARY OF THE SOUTH DAKOTA DOC, INDIVIDUAL AND OFFICIAL CAPACITY; DR. MARY CARPENTER, DIRECTOR OF THE DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH, INDIVIDUAL AND OFFICIAL CAPACITY; JENNIFER STANWICK-KLIMEK, DEPUTY WARDEN AT MIKE DURFEE STATE PRISON, INDIVIDUAL AND OFFICIAL CAPACITY; REBECCA SCHIEFFER, ASSOCIATE WARDEN AT MIKE DURFEE STATE PRISON, INDIVIDUAL AND OFFICIAL CAPACITY; ALEJANDRO REYES, ASSOCIATE WARDEN AT MIKE DURFEE STATE PRISON, INDIVIDUAL AND OFFICIAL CAPACITY; BRENT FLUKE, ASSOCIATE WARDEN AT MIKE DURFEE STTAE PRISON, INDIVIDUAL AND OFFICIAL CAPACITY; JOSH KLIMEK, UNIT MANAGER AT MIKE DURFEE STATE PRISON, INDIVIDUAL AND OFFICIAL CAPACITY; TRAVIS TJEERDSMA, MANAGER AT MIKE DURFEE STATE PRISON, INDIVIDUAL AND OFFICIAL CAPACITY; TAMMY DEJONG, MANAGER AT MIKE DURFEE STATE PRISON, INDIVIDUAL AND OFFICIAL CAPACITY; PA MICHAEL JOE HANVEY, MEDICAL PROVIDER AT MIKE DURFEE STATE PRISON, INDIVIDUAL AND OFFICIAL CAPACITY; PA BRAD ADAMS, MEDICAL PROVIDER AT MIKE DURFEE STATE PRISON, INDIVIDUAL AND OFFICIAL CAPACITY; DR. STEPHAN SCHROEDER, MEDICAL PROVIDER AT MIKE DURFEE STATE PRISON, INDIVIDUAL AND OFFICIAL CAPACITY; MISTY TOLSMA-HANVEY, NURSING SUPERVISOR, AT MIKE DURFEE STATE PRISON INDIVIDUAL AND OFFICIAL CAPACITY; LINDSEY RABBASS, NURSE AT MIKE DURFEE STATE PRISON, INDIVIDUAL AND OFFICIAL CAPACITY; ROBIN MYER, NURSE AT MIKE DURFEE STATE PRISON, INDIVIDUAL AND OFFICIAL CAPACITY; CANDICE FEJFAR, NURSE AT MIKE DURFEE STATE PRISON, INDIVIDUAL AND OFFICIAL CAPACITY; DAYNA KLAWITTER, NURSE AT MIKE DURFEE STATE PRISON, INDIVIDUAL AND OFFICIAL CAPACITY; DENNIS CROPPER, CORRECTIONAL OFFICER AT MIKE DURFEE STATE PRISON, INDIVIDUAL AND OFFICIAL CAPACITY; THOMAS HUITEMA, CORRECTIONAL OFFICER AT MIKE DURFEE STATE PRISON, INDIVIDUAL AND OFFICIAL CAPACITY; MICHAEL MEYER, CORRECTIONAL OFFICER AT MIKE DURFEE STATE PRISON, INDIVIDUAL AND OFFICIAL CAPACITY; LORI STRATMAN, CORRECTIONAL OFFICER AT MIKE DURFEE STATE PRISON, INDIVIDUAL AND OFFICIAL CAPACITY; MIKE GROSSHUESCH, CORRECTIONAL OFFICER AT MIKE DURFEE STATE PRISON, INDIVIDUAL AND OFFICIAL CAPACITY; NICOLE ST. PIERRE, CORRECTIONAL OFFICER AT MIKE DURFEE STATE PRISON, INDIVIDUAL AND OFFICIAL CAPACITY; MURIEL NAMMINGA, LAUNDRY SUPERVISOR AT MIKE DURFEE STATE PRISON, INDIVIDUAL AND OFFICIAL CAPACITY; CATHERINE SCHLIMGEN, LEGAL COUNSEL FOR THE SOUTH DAKOTA DOC, INDIVDUALAND OFFICIAL CAPACITY; UNKNOWN CBM FOOD SERVICES EMPLOYEES, INDIVIDUAL AND OFFICIAL CAPACITIES; UNKNOWN SOUTH DAKOTA DOC . EMPLOYEES, INDIVIDUAL AND OFFICIAL CAPACITIES; UNKNOWN SOUTH DAKOTA DOH EMPLOYEES, INDIVIDUAL AND OFFICIAL CAPACITIES.; JON E. LITSCHER, SECRETARY OF THE WISCONSIN DOC, INDIVIDUAL AND OFFICIAL CAPACITY; KATHARINE A. ARISS, ASSISTANT LEGAL COUNSEL FOR THE WISCONSIN DOC, INDIVIDUAL AND OFFICIAL CAPACITY; THOMAS P. MALONEY, LIBRARY SERVICES AND EDUCATIONAL TECHNOLOGY COORDINATOR FOR THE WISCONSIN DOC, INDIVIDUAL AND OFFICIAL CAPACITY; UNKNOWN WISCONSIN DOC EMPLOYEES, INDIVIDUAL AND OFFICIAL CAPACITIES; CBM FOOD SERVICES, MEAL AND COMMISSARY PROVIDER FOR THE SOUTH DAKOTA DOC, OFFICIAL CAPACITY; STEPHANIE HAMILTON, RN AT MIKE DURFEE STATE PRISON, INDIVIDUAL AND OFFICIAL CAPACITY; TIFFANY VOIGT, UNIT COORDINATOR, INDIVIDUAL AND OFFICIAL CAPACITY; DIANE ROMKEMA, MANAGER, INDIVIDUAL AND OFFICIAL CAPACITY; GLOBAL TEL & LINK CORPORATION, OFFICIAL CAPACITY; UNKNOWN GTL EMPLOYEES, INDIVIDUAL AND OFFICIAL CAPACITIES; LEXIS NEXIS, OFFICIAL CAPACITY; AND UNKNOWN LEXIS NEXIS EMPLOYEES, INDIVIDUAL AND OFFICIAL CAPACITIES; Defendants.

          REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION AS TO PLAINTIFF STANLEY J. MADAY'S AMENDED AND SUPPLEMENTAL COMPLAINT

          VERONICA L. DUFFY, UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE.

         INTRODUCTION

         This matter is before the court on the pro se complaint and amended supplemental complaint of Stanley Maday. See Docket Nos. 1 & 94. Mr. Maday, a prisoner at the South Dakota Mike Durfee State Prison (MDSP), asserts a wide-ranging variety of claims under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and Title II of the Americans With Disabilities Act (ADA), 42 U.S.C. § 12132. Under the Prison Litigation Reform Act (PLRA) it is incumbent upon the court to screen any proposed complaint and to dismiss those claims the court concludes are frivolous. 28 U.S.C. §§ 1915(e)(2)(B) (ii) and 1915A(b)(1). There are several claims and defendants in Mr. Maday's amended and supplemental complaint that do not survive this screening process. As to those claims and defendants, the court recommends dismissal.

         DISCUSSION

         A. Rule 12(b)(6) and 28 U.S.C. § 1915 Screening Standards.

         Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §§ 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii)) and 1915A(b)(1), a prisoner's complaint should be dismissed on screening if it "fails to state a claim upon which relief may be granted." This standard is the same standard as is used to determine whether a complaint satisfies the standards of Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(b)(6). Kane v. Lancaster County Dept. of Corrections, 960 F.Supp. 219 (D. Neb. 1997). "In evaluating whether a pro se plaintiff has asserted sufficient facts to state a claim, we hold 'a pro se complaint, however inartfully pleaded, ... to less stringent standards than formal pleadings drafted by lawyers.'" Jackson v. Nixon, 747 F.3d 537, 541 (8th Cir. 2014) (quoting Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89, 94 (2007) (per curiam)). "When we say that a pro se complaint should be given liberal construction, we mean that if the essence of an allegation is discernible, even though it is not pleaded with legal nicety, then the district court should construe the complaint in a way that permits the layperson's claim to be considered within the proper framework." Id. at 544 (quoting Stone v. Harry, 364 F.3d 912, 915 (8th Cir. 2004)).

         Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) allows dismissal of a claim if the plaintiff has failed to state a claim upon which relief can be granted. Plaintiffs must plead "enough facts to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face." Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly. 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007)(emphasis added).

         Under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 8(a)(2), a plaintiff must plead only "a short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief." Id. at 554-55 (quoting Fed.R.Civ.P. 8(a)(2)). A complaint does not need "detailed factual allegations" to survive a motion to dismiss, but a plaintiff must provide the grounds for his entitlement to relief and cannot merely recite the elements of his cause of action. Id. at 555 (citing Papasan v. Allain, 478 U.S. 265, 286 (1986)). There is also a "plausibility standard" which "requires a complaint with enough factual matter (taken as true)" to support the conclusion that the plaintiff has a valid claim. Id. at 556. The plaintiffs complaint must contain sufficiently specific factual allegations in order to cross the line between "possibility" and "plausibility" of entitlement to relief. Id. There are two "working principles" that apply to Rule 12(b)(6) motions. Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009). First, courts are not required to accept as true legal conclusions "couched as factual allegation[s]" contained in a complaint. Id. (citing Papasan, 478 U.S. at 286). "Threadbare recitals of the elements of a cause of action, supported by mere conclusory statements, do not suffice." Id. (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555). Rule 8 "does not unlock the doors of discovery for a plaintiff armed with nothing more than conclusions." Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678-79.

         Second, the plausibility standard is a "context-specific task that requires the reviewing court to draw on its judicial experience and common sense," Id. at 679 (quoting decision below Iqbal v. Hasty, 490 F.3d 143, 157-158 (2d Cir. 2007)). Where the plaintiffs allegations are merely conclusory, the court may not infer more than the mere possibility of misconduct, and the complaint has alleged-but has not “show[n]"--that he is entitled to relief as required by Rule 8(a)(2). Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 679 (emphasis added).

         The Court explained that a reviewing court should begin by identifying statements in the complaint that are conclusory and therefore not entitled to the presumption of truth. Id. at 679-680. Legal conclusions must be supported by factual allegations demonstrating the grounds for a plaintiffs entitlement to relief. Id. at 679; Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555; Fed.R.Civ.P. 8(a)(2). A court should assume the truth only of "well-pleaded factual allegations," and then may proceed to determine whether the allegations "plausibly give rise to an entitlement to relief." Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 679. These are the principles guiding the court's examination of the sufficiency of Mr. Maday's amended and supplemental complaint to determine whether it survives screening pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §§ 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii)) and 1915A(b)(1).

         B. Deliberate Indifference Claims

         1. The Applicable Legal Standard

         The Eighth Amendment to the United States Constitution prohibits cruel and unusual punishment. Allard v. Baldwin, 779 F.3d 768, 771 (8th Cir. 2015). That prohibition includes prison officials' deliberate indifference to the medical needs of inmates. Id., That is because "deliberate indifference to serious medical needs of prisoners constitutes 'the unnecessary and wanton infliction of pain' proscribed by the Eighth Amendment." Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 104 (1976} (quoting Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 173 (1976)). "This is true whether the indifference is manifested by prison doctors in their response to the prisoner's needs or by prison guards in intentionally denying or delaying access to medical care or intentionally interfering with the treatment once prescribed." Id. at 104-05.

         "[T]his does not mean, however, that every claim by a prisoner that he has not received adequate medical treatment states a violation of the Eighth Amendment." Id. at 105. "[A] prisoner must allege acts or omissions sufficiently harmful to evidence deliberate indifference to serious medical needs." Id. at 106. Allegations of negligence are not enough to state a claim. Jolly v. Knudsen, 205 F.3d 1094, 1096 (8th Cir. 2000) (prisoner must show more than gross negligence and more than disagreement with treatment decisions).

         Deliberate indifference requires the court to make both an objective and a subjective evaluation. Dulany v. Carnahan, 132 F.3d 1234, 1239 (8th Cir. 1997) (citing Coleman v. Rahija, 114 F.3d 778, 784 (8th Cir. 1997)). Mr. Maday is required to allege (1) that he suffered objectively serious medical needs and (2) that defendant actually knew of but deliberately disregarded those needs. Id. (citing Coleman, 114 F.3d at 784). "A serious medical need is one that has been diagnosed by a physician as requiring treatment, or one that is so obvious that even a layperson would easily recognize the necessity for a doctor's attention." Coleman, 114 F.3d at 784. To establish liability, "the official must both be aware of facts from which the inference could be drawn that a substantial risk of harm exists, and he must also draw the inference." Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 837 (1994). A plaintiff asserting deliberate indifference "must show more than even gross negligence"-he "must establish a 'mental state akin to criminal recklessness: disregarding a known risk to the inmate's health.'" Allard. 779 F.3d at 771-72.

         "[A] total deprivation of care is not a necessary condition for finding a constitutional violation: 'Grossly incompetent or inadequate care can [also] constitute deliberate indifference, as can a doctor's decision to take an easier and less efficacious course of treatment.'" Langford v. Norris, 614 F.3d 445, 460 (8th Cir. 2010) (quoting Smith v. Jenkins, 919 F.2d 90, 93 (8th Cir. 1990)). A plaintiff can also show deliberate indifference by demonstrating that a defendant denied access to or intentionally delayed medical care. Allard, 779 F.3d at 772.

         2. New Facts Regarding Previously-Asserted Claims

         Mr. Maday asserted deliberate indifference claims in his first complaint regarding medical treatment of his toes, heels, and feet as well as claims for proper diabetic shoes, socks, and diet. The additional facts asserted by Mr. Maday that supplement those previous claims against previously-named defendants survive screening. When considering these claims, the court will take into account the facts alleged in both the initial complaint and the amended and supplemental complaint.

         3. New Defendant-Stephanie Hamilton

         Mr. Maday seeks to sue a new defendant, Stephanie Hamilton, a registered nurse and employee of the South Dakota Department of Health. See Docket No. 94 at p. 1, ¶ 51. Mr. Maday asserts claims against Ms, Hamilton in both her individual and official capacities. Id. at p. 2.

         The facts Mr. Maday asserts against Ms. Hamilton are that on June 27, 2016, Mr. Maday requested a "lay in tray" for meals so he could eat in his cell and not have to walk to the cafeteria. Id. at pp. 5-6, ¶ 517. He alleges that Brad Adams, a physician's assistant and medical care provider at MDSP, had previously given orders that Mr. Maday should stay off his feet if the pain in his feet became too bad. Id. Mr. Maday alleges Ms. Hamilton denied Mr. Maday's request for a "lay in tray" in contravention of Mr. Adams' orders. Id.

         Mr. Maday also asserts approximately 8 months later, on February 16, 2017, Mr. Maday asked the nurses to help him reapply the splint Brad Adams had applied to Mr. Maday's leg the previous day. Id. Mr. Maday had to remove the splint due to swelling, but then states he sought to have the nurses reapply it. Id., Mr. Maday asserts Ms. Hamilton mocked him, saying, "Can't you touch your toes?" Id. Mr. Maday never states whether Ms. Hamilton or another nurse assisted with reapplying the splint or refused to do so.

         This allegation conflicts with Mr. Maday's description of these events in his original complaint. In his original complaint, Mr. Maday states he took the splint off after he experienced swelling, but then states “[a]s a result of these difficulties I refused the splint treatment. . ." See Docket No. 1 at p. 22, ¶ 90.

         In any event, the reason Brad Adams applied a splint on February 15, 2017, was because the prison did not have a medical walking boot sufficiently large to fit Mr. Maday's foot and calf. Five days after being treated by Mr. Adams, Mr. Maday saw an outside specialist who gave him an air cast, so Mr. Maday was without a cast, boot, or splint for a total of 4 days (one day was with the splint).

         It appears Mr. Maday's claim against Ms. Hamilton concerning her alleged conduct on February 16, 2017, is based solely on her tone of voice and words. In the "claims" section of his amended and supplemental complaint, Mr. Maday states *[b]y constantly addressing inmates in a condescending manner, minimalizing their concerns, ignoring their complaints and inserting her own facts into the record, RN Stephanie Hamilton is deliberately indifferent to Plaintiffs serious medical needs. This is a violation of the protections against cruel and unusual punishment guaranteed by the United States Constitution." See Docket No. 94 at p. 17, ¶ 547. Speaking to an inmate in a condescending tone of voice or minimalizing their concerns is not deliberate indifference in violation of the Eighth Amendment. Ignoring an inmate's complaint about a sufficiently serious concern may be gist for an Eighth Amendment claim, but regarding the splint incident, Mr. Maday never alleges Ms. Hamilton outright refused to help him reapply the splint. He never states whether another nurse helped him. Moreover, this sequence of events in the amended complaint conflicts blatantly with his version of events in his original complaint. The court finds the allegation against Ms. Hamilton regarding the splint does not state a claim and is not plausible.

         As to the issue of the "lay in tray," according to Mr. Maday's own version of the facts, Brad Adams did not issue an order to the effect Mr. Maday was to stay in his cell. He only stated Mr. Maday should stay off his feet if they became too painful. Ms. Hamilton's denial of a lay in tray was not deliberate indifference. "A serious medical need is one that has been diagnosed by a physician as requiring treatment, or one that is so obvious that even a layperson would easily recognize the necessity for a doctor's attention." Coleman, 114 F.3d at 784. To establish liability, "the official must both be aware of facts from which the inference could be drawn that a substantial risk of harm exists, and he must also draw the inference." Farmer, 511 U.S. at 837. A plaintiff asserting deliberate indifference "must show more than ...


Buy This Entire Record For $7.95

Download the entire decision to receive the complete text, official citation,
docket number, dissents and concurrences, and footnotes for this case.

Learn more about what you receive with purchase of this case.