United States District Court, D. South Dakota, Western Division
ORDER DENYING MOTION FOR LEAVE TO AMEND, DENYING
MOTION FOR RELIEF FROM JUDGMENT, AND DENYING MOTION FOR
EXPERT ACCESS
KAREN
E. SCHREIER, UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE
Petitioner,
Charles Russell Rhines, moves the court for leave to amend
his petition for habeas corpus under Fed.R.Civ.P. 15(a)(2),
or in the alternative, moves the court for relief from
judgment under Fed.R.Civ.P. 60(b)(6). Docket 383. Respondent,
Darin Young, resists the motion on both grounds. Docket 389.
In addition, Rhines moves the court for an order requiring
Young to produce Rhines for two mental health expert
evaluations in support of a potential clemency application to
the South Dakota Governor. Docket 394. Respondent also
opposes Rhines's motion for expert access. Docket
396.[1]
For the following reasons, the court denies Rhines's
motion to amend under Rule 15(a)(2), denies Rhines's
motion for relief from judgment under Rule 60(b)(6), and
denies Rhines's motion for expert access.
BACKGROUND
The
factual and procedural history of this case is more fully set
forth in the court's February 16, 2016 order granting
summary judgment in favor of respondent. See Docket
305. The court will briefly summarize the procedural history
and then address any facts that are relevant to Rhines's
pending motions throughout the analysis.
Rhines
is an inmate at the South Dakota State Penitentiary in Sioux
Falls, South Dakota. He was convicted of premeditated
first-degree murder and third-degree burglary of a Dig'Em
Donuts Shop in Rapid City, South Dakota. On January 26, 1993,
a jury found that the death penalty should be imposed, and
the trial judge sentenced Rhines to death by lethal
injection. The South Dakota Supreme Court affirmed
Rhines's conviction and sentence on direct appeal, and
the United States Supreme Court denied further review in
1996. Rhines applied for a writ of habeas corpus in state
court, raising numerous issues, which was denied in 1998 and
affirmed by the South Dakota Supreme Court in 2000.
Rhines
then filed a federal petition for a writ of habeas corpus in
2000. This court found several of Rhines's claims were
unexhausted and granted a stay pending exhaustion in state
court. Following respondent's appeal, the Eighth Circuit
vacated the stay and remanded the case. Rhines filed a
petition for a writ of certiorari in the United States
Supreme Court, which granted certiorari. After finding that a
stay and abeyance is permissible under some circumstances,
the Supreme Court remanded the case for further analysis not
relevant to the pending motions. Ultimately, Rhines's
petition in this court was stayed until he exhausted his
state court claims. When this court lifted the stay,
respondent moved for summary judgment. On February 16, 2016,
this court granted respondent's motion for summary
judgment, denied Rhines's amended habeas petition, and
ruled on numerous other motions not relevant to the current
motions. See Dockets 304, 305, 306. The court then
denied Rhines's motion to alter or amend the judgment
under Fed.R.Civ.P. 59(e). Docket 348. On August 3, 2016,
Rhines appealed this court's rulings to the Eighth
Circuit Court of Appeals. Docket 357. Rhines has filed the
two current motions during the pendency of his appeal.
DISCUSSION
I.
Rhines's Motion for Leave to Amend Petition under
Fed.R.Civ.P. 15(a)(2)
Under
the Anti-Terrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996
(AEDPA), a petitioner must file his or her application for a
writ of habeas corpus within one year of:
(A) the date on which the judgment became final by the
conclusion of direct review or the expiration of the time for
seeking such review;
(B) the date on which the impediment to filing an application
created by State action in violation of the Constitution or
laws of the United States is removed, if the applicant was
prevented from filing by such State action;
(C) the date on which the constitutional right asserted was
initially recognized by the Supreme Court, if the right has
been newly recognized by the Supreme Court and made
retroactively applicable to cases on collateral review; or
(D) the date on which the factual predicate of the claim or
claims presented could have been discovered through the
exercise of due diligence.
28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(1).
Because
habeas proceedings are civil in nature, the Federal Rules of
Civil Procedure apply. See 28 U.S.C. § 2242
(“[An application for a writ of habeas corpus] may be
amended or supplemented as provided in the rules of procedure
applicable to civil actions.”). Federal Rule of Civil
Procedure 15(a)(2) allows a party to amend its pleading with
the opposing party's consent or the court's leave
“when justice so requires.” But a
petitioner's amendment must meet the relation back
requirements set forth in Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 15,
which provides:
(1) When an Amendment Relates Back. An amendment to
a pleading relates back to the date of the original pleading
when:
(A) the law that provides the applicable statute of
limitations allows relation back;
(B) the amendment asserts a claim or defense that arose out
of the conduct, transaction, or occurrence set out--or
attempted to be set out--in the original pleading . . . .
Fed. R. Civ. P. 15(c); see also McKay v. Purkett,
255 F.3d 660, 660-61 (8th Cir. 2001) (applying Rule 15(c) to
a petitioner's § 2254 amended petition and affirming
the district court's dismissal of the amended claims
because they did not relate back to petitioner's original
claims). Thus, in the habeas context, any amendment to a
timely filed habeas petition must be filed within AEDPA's
one-year limitations period or the amendment must assert a
claim that arose out of the conduct, transaction, or
occurrence set out in the original petition.
The
Supreme Court has addressed what the phrase “conduct,
transaction, or occurrence” means under Fed.R.Civ.P.
15(c)(2) in the habeas framework. In Mayle, the
Ninth Circuit, in agreement with the Seventh Circuit, had
interpreted “conduct, transaction, or occurrence”
to allow relation back to an original habeas petition when
the petitioner's new claim stemmed from the
petitioner's trial, conviction, or sentence. Mayle v.
Felix, 545 U.S. 644, 656 (2005). The Supreme Court
rejected that definition because it was too broad.
Id. at 656-58. “An amended habeas petition, we
hold, does not relate back (and thereby escape AEDPA's
one-year time limit) when it asserts a new ground for relief
supported by facts that differ in both time and type from
those the original pleading set forth.” Id. at
650.
The
substance of Rhines's new claim is that some jurors from
his trial have recently expressed the notion that a
homosexual bias against Rhines “played a significant
role in the decision to sentence him to death.” Docket
383 at 1. And Rhines argues such juror bias is now admissible
under the United States Supreme Court's recent decision
in Pena-Rodriguez v. Colorado, 137 S.Ct. 855 (2017).
Id.
Because
Rhines has appealed this court's denial of his habeas
petition to the Eighth Circuit and that appeal is still
pending, this court must first determine if it has
jurisdiction over Rhines's current motion. Rhines
maintains that this court still has jurisdiction to allow his
amendment because “the judgment is not yet
final.” Id. at 3. Other than his reliance on
Nims v. Ault, 251 F.3d 698 (8th Cir. 2001) and
resistance to Williams v. Norris, 461 F.3d 999 (8th
Cir. 2006), which will be addressed below, see infra
Section II.B., Rhines has not cited any Eighth Circuit
precedent to establish that a judgment is not considered
“final” until it is affirmed on appeal. In
response, respondent contends that this court's judgment
is final so the Eighth Circuit has exclusive jurisdiction
over Rhines's case. Docket 389 at 7-9.
A.
Judgment is Final
In
general, a district court decision is final if “there
is some clear and unequivocal manifestation by the trial
court of its belief that the decision made, so far as [the
court] is concerned, is the end of the case.”
Waterson v. Hall, 515 F.3d 852, 855 (8th Cir. 2008)
(internal quotations omitted) (alteration in original).
“A final decision is ordinarily one which disposes of
all the rights of all the parties to an action.”
Patterson v. City of Omaha, 779 F.3d 795, 800 (8th
Cir. 2015) (quotation omitted).
Here,
judgment is final. In addition to the order granting
respondent's motion for summary judgment and denying
Rhines's petition for habeas corpus (Docket 305), this
court entered a judgment denying Rhines's petition for
habeas corpus relief on February 16, 2016. Docket 306.
Entering a judgment clearly demonstrated the court's
belief that Rhines's case was over. Rhines moved the
court to alter or amend its judgment under Fed.R.Civ.P. 59(e)
(Docket 323), which this court denied. Docket 348. Rhines
then appealed several of this court's rulings, including
this court's order granting summary judgment in favor of
respondent (Docket 305) and judgment (Docket 306). Docket
357. See Patterson, 779 F.3d at 800 (noting that the
Eighth Circuit's jurisdiction is “limited to
appeals taken from final decisions of the district
courts.”). ...