United States District Court, D. South Dakota, Northern Division
MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER
CHARLES B. KORNMANN UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE.
filed this action pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983
contending defendant Josh Hoveh violated her Constitutional
rights when he used excessive force against her. She claims
defendants Barry Hillestad and Day County failed to train or
supervise defendant Hoven.
filed a motion for summary judgment. Defendant Hoven contends
that he is entitled to qualified immunity from damages.
Defendant Hillestad and Day County contend that
plaintiff's claims against them must be dismissed because
defendant Hoven is entitled to qualified immunity from
damages. Defendant Hillestad further contends that he is not
subject to vicarious liability for the alleged Constitutional
deprivation. Finally, defendant Day Comity contends that
plaintiff cannot establish her failure to train claim.
Defendants contend that plaintiff was injured, not as a
result of defendant Hoven's use of force or lack of
training, but instead because she was "highly
intoxicated" and "fell face first to the ground
without attempting to break her fall" When defendant
Hoven used force in response to her resisting arrest.
judgment is proper where there is no genuine issue as to any
material fact and the moving party is entitled to judgment as
a matter of law. Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(C): Knutson v.
Schwan's Home Service. Inc.. 711 F.3d 911, 913 (8th
Cir. 2013). The United States Supreme Court has held that:
The plain language of Rule 56(c) mandates the entry of
summary judgment. . . against a party who fails to make a
showing sufficient to establish the existence of an element
essential to that party's case, and on which that party
will bear the burden of proof at trial. In such a situation,
there can be "no genuine issue as to any material fact,
" since a complete failure of proof concerning an
essential element of the non-moving party's case
necessarily renders all other facts immaterial.
Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322-23, 106
S.Ct. 2548, 2552, 91 L.Ed. 2D 265 (1986).
The party seeking summary judgment must first identify
grounds demonstrating the absence of a genuine issue of
material fact. Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S.
317, 323, 106 S.Ct. 2548, 2553, 91L.Ed.2d265(1986). Such a
showing shifts to the non-movant the burden to go beyond the
pleadings and present affirmative evidence showing that a
genuine issue of material fact exists. Anderson v.
Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 256-57, 106 S.Ct.
2505, 2514, 91 L.Ed.2d 202 (1986). The non-moving party
"must do more than simply show that there is some
metaphysical doubt as to the material facts."
Matsushita Elec. Ind. Co., 475 U.S. 574, 586, 106
S.Ct. 1348, 1356, 89 L.Ed.2d (1986). The non-movant
"must show there is sufficient evidence to support a
jury verdict in [its] favor." Nat'l Bank of
Commerce v. Dow Chem. Co., 165 F.3d 602, 607 (5th Cir.
1999). "Factual disputes that are irrelevant or
unnecessary will not be counted, " Anderson,
477 U.S. at 248, 106 S.Ct. 2505, and a mere scintilla of
evidence supporting the nonmovant's position will not -
fulfill the non-movant's burden, id. at 252, 106
Uhiren v. Bristol-Myers Squibb Co.. Inc., 346 F.3d
824, 827 (Sth Cir. 2003). "The mere existence of a
factual dispute is insufficient alone to bar summary
judgment; rather, die dispute must be outcome determinative
under prevailing law. " Grey v. City of Oak
Grove. Mo., 396 F.3d 1031, 1034 (8th Cir. 2005).
to materiality, the substantive law will identify which facts
are material. Only disputes over facts that might affect the
outcome of the suit under the governing law will properly
preclude the entry of summary judgment. Factual disputes that
are irrelevant or unnecessary will not be counted."
Anderson v. Liberty Lobby. Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248,
106 S.Ct. 2505, 2510, 91 L.Ed.2d 202 (1986). "A material
fact dispute is genuine if the evidence is sufficient to
allow a reasonable jury to return a verdict for the
non-moving party." Landon v. Northwest Airlines.
Inc., 72 F.3d 620, 634 (8th Cir. 1995).
immunity is a doctrine that "shields a government
official from liability unless his conduct violates
'clearly established statutory or constitutional rights
of which a reasonable person would have known.'"
Franklin v. Peterson, 878 F.3d 631, 634-35 (8th Cir.
2017) (quoting Bums v. Eaton, 752 F.3d 1136, 1139
(8th Cir, 2014) (quoting Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 57
U.S. 800, 818, 102 S.Ct. 2727, 2738, 73 L.Ed.2d 396 (1982))).
Qualified immunity protects "all but the plainly
incompetent or those who knowingly violate the law."
Malley v. Briggs, 475 U.S. 335, 341, 106 S.Ct. 1092,
89 L.Ed.2d 271 (1986). Because it protects officials from the
burden of defending insubstantial claims, as well as from
damage liability, the Supreme Court has "stressed the
importance of resolving immunity questions at the earliest
possible stage in litigation." Pearson v.
Callahan,555 U.S. 223, 232, 129 S.Ct. 808, 172 L.Ed.2d