United States District Court, D. South Dakota, Southern Division
ORDER DENYING MOTION TO DISMISS INDICTMENT
KAREN
E. SCHREIER UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE
Defendant,
Reymundo Sauceda, moves pro se to dismiss the
indictment in this matter under Federal Rule of Criminal
Procedure 48(b) because he has been deprived of his right to
a speedy trial.[1] Docket 171. Plaintiff, the United States,
opposes the motion. Docket 175. For the reasons stated below,
the court denies Sauceda's motion to dismiss the
indictment.
BACKGROUND
On July
26, 2016, Sauceda was arrested on a complaint, which alleged
that Sauceda was part of a conspiracy to distribute a
controlled substance in violation of 21 U.S.C. §§
841(a)(1), 846. See Docket 1. Sauceda entered an
initial appearance on the complaint on July 27, 2016. Docket
7. On August 9, 2016, an indictment was filed charging
Sauceda and co-defendant Martin Rios with conspiracy to
distribute a controlled substance in violation of 21 U.S.C.
§§ 841(a)(1), 846. Docket 15. Sauceda entered his
initial appearance on the indictment on August 15, 2016, and
Rios entered his initial appearance on the indictment on
August 18, 2016. Dockets 21 and 25. The court issued a
scheduling and case management order as to Sauceda and Rios
on August 19, 2016. Docket 29.
Since
the issuance of the August 19, 2016 scheduling and case
management order, Sauceda and his attorneys have filed eleven
continuance motions.[2] See Dockets 42, 51, 62, 72, 77,
79, 96, 161, 168, 170, 181. As reflected in these continuance
motions-as well as in the court's orders granting the
majority of the continuance motions-the reason for the
requested continuances was that Sauceda's attorneys
needed additional time to prepare for trial in order to
effectively represent Sauceda.[3]
On July
6, 2016, a superseding indictment was filed, which added
Ramiro Reyna, Jr., as a co-defendant. Docket 84. Co-defendant
Reyna has moved for two continuances following his entry into
the case. Dockets 141 and 174; see also Dockets 147
and 179 (orders granting continuances). Sauceda entered his
initial appearance on the superseding indictment on July 31,
2017. Docket 102.
On
August 29, 2017, Sauceda filed three motions to suppress
evidence. Dockets 105, 107, and 109. On September 12, 2017,
United States Magistrate Judge Veronica Duffy held an
evidentiary hearing on Sauceda's motions to suppress.
Docket 121. Magistrate Judge Duffy filed a report and
recommendation denying Sauceda's motions to suppress on
September 27, 2017. Docket 139. And on October 16, 2017, this
court entered an order adopting the report and recommendation
in full following Sauceda's failure to object to the
report and recommendation. Docket 155.
DISCUSSION
Sauceda
filed his pro se motion to dismiss the indictment
for alleged speedy trial right violations on January 5, 2018.
Docket 171. On January 18, 2018, the court held a hearing on
Sauceda's motion to dismiss.[4] At this hearing, the court
went over the history of this case and heard argument from
the parties regarding the motion to dismiss.[5] Docket 178. After
considering the arguments presented, the court orally
indicated that it would deny Sauceda's motion to dismiss.
Id. On January 23, 2018-less than one month after
Sauceda filed his motion to dismiss-Sauceda and his counsel
filed an eleventh continuance motion. Docket 181; see
also Docket 182 (waiver of speedy trial acknowledgment
signed by Sauceda). The court granted this continuance on
January 25, 2018. See Docket 183.
I.
Speedy Trial Act
“Under
the Speedy Trial Act, a defendant must be brought to trial
within 70 days of his indictment or first appearance,
whichever is later.” United States v. Mallett,
751 F.3d 907, 910-11 (8th Cir. 2014) (quotation omitted);
see also 18 U.S.C. § 3161(c)(1). When
conducting a defendant's speedy trial calculation,
certain days are excluded from the calculation. 18 U.S.C.
§ 3161(h); United States v. Aldaco, 477 F.3d
1008, 1016 (8th Cir. 2007). “After these days are
excluded, if the total number of non-excludable days exceeds
seventy, then the district court must dismiss the indictment
upon the defendant's motion.” Aldaco, 477
F.3d at 1016-17 (citations omitted). “The defendant has
the burden of proof to support the motion, with the exception
of the exclusion of time under 18 U.S.C. § 3161(h)(3)
concerning the unavailability of the defendant or an
essential witness.” Id. at 1017 (citing 18
U.S.C. § 3162(a)(2)).
Here, a
review of Sauceda's speedy trial clock shows that 70 days
are remaining. The reason Sauceda's speedy trial clock
remains at 70 days is because following Sauceda's August
15, 2016 initial appearance on the indictment, excludables
have been running either to await the initial appearance of a
co-defendant or because continuances were requested by
Sauceda. As indicated above, Sauceda and his attorneys have
filed eleven motions to continue following the issuance of
the court's August 19, 2016 scheduling and case
management order. See Dockets 42, 51, 62, 72, 77,
79, 96, 161, 168, 170, 181. And each of the court's
orders granting these continuances indicated that
“[t]he period of delay resulting from such continuance
is excluded in computing the time within which the trial of
the offense must commence.” See, e.g., Dockets
43, 80, 179 (citing 18 U.S.C. § 3161(h)(7)(A)). Thus,
because Sauceda has primarily been the party requesting
continuances, and because Sauceda makes no showing of how his
statutory speedy trial rights were violated, the court
concludes that Sauceda has not met his burden to show that
more than seventy non-excludable days have run.[6]See
Aldaco, 477 F.3d at 1017 (citing 18 U.S.C. §
3162(a)(2)).
II.
Sixth Amendment Right to a Speedy Trial
The
Sixth Amendment guarantees that “[i]n all criminal
prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right to a speedy
and public trial . . . .” U.S. Const. amend. VI.
“The Sixth Amendment right ‘attaches at the time
of arrest or indictment, whichever comes first, and continues
until the trial commences.' ” Aldaco, 477
F.3d at 1019 (quoting United States v. Perez-Perez,
337 F.3d 990, 995 (8th Cir. 2003)). In the Eighth Circuit,
“Sixth Amendment challenges are reviewed separately
from the Speedy Trial Act.” Id. at 1018.
“But . . . ‘[i]t would be unusual to find the
Sixth Amendment has been violated when the Speedy Trial Act
has not.' ” Id. at 1018-19 (quoting
United States v. Titlbach, 339 F.3d 692, 699 (8th
Cir. 2003)). “ ‘To trigger speedy trial analysis,
the defendant must allege ...