United States District Court, D. South Dakota, Northern Division
CHARLES B. KORNMANN UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE.
instituted this action pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983
alleging deprivation of constitutional rights while he was a
pretrial detainee. Plaintiff was allowed to proceed without
the prepayment of fees and the U.S. Marshals Service was
ordered to effect service.
the defendants alleged to have been employed by Walworth
County are named by first name only. I indicated in my
previous order directing service that the surnames of those
defendants should be supplied to the plaintiff. Nonetheless,
when counsel entered their appearances on behalf of the
Walworth County defendants, they specifically entered an
appearance for those defendants by first name only. Likewise,
their motion to dismiss and brief fail to set forth the
surnames of those defendants.
U.S. Marshals Service filed returns of service for all
defendants. Defendants Justin Unknown, Patty Unknown, Lance
Unknown, Glenn Unknown, and Cindy Unknown were all
"personally" served, although the return of service
shows only that some persons named Justin, Patty, Lance,
Glenn, and Cindy were served. The U.S. Marshals Service did
not indicate at all who exactly was served.
Jeremy Johnson, Marissa Unknown, Heather Kroonje, Ron
Unknown, and Tammy Unknown were not served. The U.S. Marshals
Service indicated on the return of service that those persons
were no longer employed by Walworth County.
defendants were named in their individual and official
capacities. The Court deleted reference to capacity in the
caption for brevity.
Corson County and Walworth County defendants have moved to
dismiss the official capacity claims for failure to state a
claim that any official policy or custom was the moving force
behind any claimed constitutional violations. The Corson
County defendants further contend that dismissal is
appropriate because plaintiffs claims do not support a
finding of deliberate indifference, that plaintiff has failed
to allege any claim against defendants Dale, Tvedt, Varilek,
or Bogue, and that defendant Bogue is entitled to
prosecutorial immunity if it is contended that any claims
arise out of his prosecution of the plaintiff.
has moved to strike what he claims are motions for summary
judgment, contending that defendants have failed to properly
support such a motion. I reject that contention. Defendants
filed motions to dismiss and briefs in support thereof as
required by the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure and the
Local Rules for the District of South Dakota.
contends that defendants have failed to timely file an answer
and that defendants have waived certain defenses. No answer
is due at this time since the Court has not yet ruled on the
pre-answer motions to dismiss.
contends counsel of record for the defendants have acted in
violation of the law and in violation of the code of ethics
in filing and pursuing the motions to dismiss. I reject
outright any such contention. Counsel for defendants have
properly raised certain issues by pre-answer motion to
dismiss as required by Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(b).
has filed motions for the appointment of counsel.
detainee's conditions of confinement claims arise out of
the Fourteenth Amendment's Due Process Clause. Walton
v. Dawson, 752 F.3d 1109, 1117 (8th Cir. 2014)
("Although 'the Eighth Amendment has no
application' until there has been a 'formal
adjudication of guilt, ' the Fourteenth Amendment gives
state pretrial detainees-just as the Fifth Amendment gives
federal pretrial detainees-rights which are 'at least as
great as the Eighth Amendment protections available to a
convicted prisoner.'") (City of Revere v. Mass.
Gen. Hosp., 463 U.S. 239, 244, 103 S.Ct. 2979, 77
L.Ed.2d 605 (1983)). "The Constitution affords greater
protection to quoting a pretrial detainee compared
to a convicted inmate in the sense that '[d]ue process
requires that a pretrial detainee not be punished.'"
Walton v. Dawson, 752 F.3d at 1117 (Quotins Bell
v. Wolfish, 441 U.S. 520, 535 n. 16, 99 S.Ct. 1861, 60
L.Ed.2d 447 (1979)).
the Due Process Clause, a pretrial detainee may be subject to
conditions and restrictions only to the extent such
conditions do not amount to punishment. Bell v.
Wolfish, 441 U.S. at 536, 99 S.Ct. at 1872-73. Under the
Due Process Clause, prior to an adjudication of guilty a
pretrial detainee cannot be punished "at all."