Submitted: November 17, 2016
from United States District Court for the District of
Nebraska - Omaha
COLLOTON, BEAM, and GRUENDER, Circuit Judges.
COLLOTON, Circuit Judge.
Vance appeals a judgment of the district court upholding the
Social Security Commissioner's denial of her application
for supplemental security income. We affirm.
applied for supplemental security income under Title XVI of
the Social Security Act, 42 U.S.C. § 1382, based on a
nerve disorder. She claimed a disability onset date of
January 1, 2010, but later amended it to October 3, 2011. The
Social Security Administration denied Vance's claim
initially and on reconsideration. After a hearing in July
2013, an Administrative Law Judge, applying the familiar
five-step process under the regulations, found that Vance was
not disabled. See Bowen v. Yuckert, 482 U.S. 137,
140-42 (1987); 20 C.F.R. § 416.920 (2011).
determined at step one that Vance had not engaged in
"substantial gainful activity" since October 3,
2011, the application date. At step two, he determined that
Vance suffered from severe impairments-inherited myelopathy
versus conversion disorder, adjustment disorder with mixed
anxiety and depressed mood, and borderline intellectual
functioning. At step three, however, the ALJ concluded that
these impairments did not meet the severity of one of the
listed impairments in 20 C.F.R. Part 404, Subpart P, Appendix
proceeding to steps four and five, the ALJ determined
Vance's residual functional capacity. The judge concluded
that Vance had the capacity "to perform a range of work
activity that: requires no more than a sedentary level of
physical exertion; accommodates the use of a walker; and
involves only unskilled, simple, routine, and
repetitive" tasks. Relying on testimony of a vocational
expert, the ALJ found that despite these limitations, Vance
was able to perform jobs that exist in significant numbers in
the national economy. Based on this analysis, the ALJ
concluded that Vance was not disabled and denied her
application. The Appeals Council denied review, and the
district court upheld the ALJ's decision.
appeals, citing three alleged errors: (1) that the ALJ failed
to explain adequately his decision that Vance did not meet
any of the Listing 11.00 impairments, (2) that substantial
evidence did not support the ALJ's conclusion that Vance
did not meet Listing 12.05C, and (3) that the ALJ failed to
give controlling weight to the opinion of Vance's
review the district court's judgment de novo,
considering evidence that both supports and detracts from the
ALJ's conclusion. We will affirm if substantial evidence
on the record as a whole supports the Commissioner's
determination. Julin v. Colvin, 826 F.3d 1082, 1086
(8th Cir. 2016). "Substantial evidence is less than a
preponderance, but enough that a reasonable mind would find
it adequate to support the ALJ's decision."
Gonzales v. Barnhart, 465 F.3d 890, 894 (8th. Cir.
argues that the ALJ failed to point to specific evidence to
support its step-three conclusion that she did not meet any
of the requirements of Listing 11.00. This Listing enumerates
several categories of neurological impairments, such as
epilepsy, brain tumors, multiple sclerosis, and amyotrophic
lateral sclerosis. Vance also argues that the ALJ's
discussion of her neurological impairments in step four was
inadequate because it was too cursory and one-sided. Vance
asks us to remand so that the ALJ can provide a more detailed
analysis of this Listing.
three, the ALJ did not discuss any particular Listing 11.00
neurological impairment, but he did address the Listing
overall. The judge stated that in reaching the conclusion
that Vance did not meet the Listings, "the undersigned
has appropriately evaluated medical and other evidence
pertaining to the claimant's medically determinable
impairments in conjunction with all the relevant severity
criteria contained within the 1.00 ...