United States District Court, D. South Dakota, Southern Division
ORDER DISMISSING COMPLAINT
LAWRENCE L. PIERSOL ATTEST UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE.
Leslie Johnson, is an inmate at the Mike Durfee State Prison
in Springfield, South Dakota. Johnson filed a pro se lawsuit
pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Docket 1. The Court has
now screened Johnson's complaint pursuant to 28 U.S.C.
§ 1915A. For the reasons stated below, the Court
dismisses Johnson's complaint.
filed this complaint on February 24, 2017. Docket 1. In his
complaint, Johnson alleges that defendants CBM violated his
rights by operating a monopoly of the food services in Mike
Durfee State Prison. Id. He alleges that the
remaining defendants violated his rights by contracting with
CBM. Id. Johnson seeks injunctive relief, money
damages, and nullification of the contract between CBM and
the South Dakota Department of Corrections.
Court must accept the well-pleaded allegations in the
complaint as true and draw all reasonable inferences in favor
of the non-moving party. Schriener v. Quicken Loans,
Inc., 774 F.3d 442, 444 (8th Cir. 2014). Civil rights
and pro se complaints must be liberally construed.
Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89, 94 (2007) (citation
omitted); Bediako v. Stein Mart, Inc., 354 F.3d 835,
839 (8th Cir. 2004). Even with this construction, "a pro
se complaint must contain specific facts supporting its
conclusions." Martin v. Sargent, 780 F.2d 1334,
1337 (8th Cir. 1985); Ellis v. City of Minneapolis,
518 F.App'x 502, 504 (8th Cir. 2013). Civil rights
complaints cannot be merely conclusory. Daw's v.
Hall, 992 F.2d 151, 152 (8th Cir. 1993); Parker v.
Porter, 221 F.App'x 481, 482 (8th Cir. 2007).
complaint "does not need detailed factual allegations .
. . [but] requires more than labels and conclusions, and a
formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of action
will not do." BellAtl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550
U.S. 544, 555 (2007). "If a plaintiff cannot make the
requisite showing, dismissal is appropriate."
Abdullah v. Minnesota, 261 F.App'x 926, 927 (8th
Cir. 2008); Beavers v. Lockhart, 755 F.2d 657, 663
(8th Cir. 1985). 28 U.S.C. § 1915A requires the Court to
screen prisoner complaints and dismiss them if they are
"(1) frivolous, malicious, or fail to state a claim
upon which relief may be granted; or (2) seek monetary
relief from a defendant who is immune from such relief."
Screening Under § 1915A
raises a claim under the Sherman Antitrust Act ("Sherman
Act"). Section 1 of the Sherman Act "makes unlawful
'every contract, combination ... or conspiracy, in
restraint of trade or commerce among the several
States.'" Parker v. Brown, 317 U.S. 341,
350 (1943) (quoting 15 U.S.C. § 1). Section 2 of the Act
"makes it unlawful to 'monopolize, or attempt to
monopolize, or combine or conspire with any other person or
persons, to monopolize any part of the trade or commerce
among the several States.' " Id. (quoting
15 U.S.C. §2).
prima facie claim of monopolization under the Sherman Act
requires a plaintiff to show that the defendant
'possessed monopoly power in the relevant market"
and "willfully acquired or maintained that power.'
" HDC Med., Inc. v. Minntech Corp., 474 F.3d
543, 547 (8th Cir. 2007) (quoting Amerinet, Inc. v. Xerox
Corp., 972 F.2d 1483, 1490 (8th Cir. 1992)). To make
this showing "a plaintiff must establish that the
defendant has a dominant market share in a well-defined
relevant market." Id. (quoting Morgenstern
v. Wilson, 29 F.3d 1291, 1296 (8th Cir. 1994)).
fails to state a claim under the Sherman Act. He does not
make any allegations concerning CBM's market share or any
allegations concerning the relevant market. The
"market" CBM operates in is not Mike Durfee State
Prison, but the market of food providers contracting with
prisons. Johnson does not allege that the South Dakota
Department of Corrections contracted with CBM because CBM has
a dominant market share of that market. Therefore, Johnson
fails to state a claim under ...