United States District Court, D. South Dakota, Southern Division
JAMES I. DALE, a/k/a James Irving Dale, Plaintiff,
ROBERT DOOLEY, UNKNOWN DEPARTMENT OF CORRECTIONS STAFF, CBM CORRECTIONAL FOODSERVICES, UNKNOWN CBM EMPLOYEES, Defendants.
ORDER DENYING MOTION TO COMPEL AND GRANTING IN PART
AND DENYING IN PART MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT
Lawrence L. Piersol United States District Judge
James I. Dale, filed this lawsuit pursuant to 42 U.S.C.
§ 1983 claiming that defendants violated his
constitutional rights. At that time, Dale was an inmate at
the South Dakota State Penitentiary in Sioux Falls. Dale now
moves this Court to compel discovery, Docket 82, and
defendants move for summary judgment. Docket 90. For the
reasons stated below, Dale's motion is denied and
defendants' motion is granted in part and denied in part.
amended complaint, Dale raised claims under the First,
Eighth, and Fourteenth Amendments, the Religious Land Use
Institutionalized Persons Act (RLUIPA), the Americans with
Disabilities Act, and the Rehabilitation Act. Docket 21. On
December 12, 2014, defendants filed their first motion for
summary judgment. Docket 50. United States Magistrate Judge
Veronica L. Duffy recommended that the court grant defendants
summary judgment as to the claims under the Eighth Amendment,
the Americans with Disabilities Act, and the Rehabilitation
Act. Docket 68.
Judge Duffy found that certain defendants were not entitled
to summary judgment based upon qualified immunity as to
whether they had denied Dale a kosher diet because Dale
should be allowed to do limited discovery. Id. at
57. Magistrate Judge Duffy recommended limiting this
discovery to determining the identities of the "
'unknown CBM employees' and 'unknown [Department
of Corrections (DOC)] staff which he claims are the very
people who violated his constitutional rights[, ]" and
"whether the entity responsible for providing his kosher
diet (CBM Correctional Food Services) [was] put on notice of
the claims contained in Mr. Dale's fellow inmates'
affidavits (i.e. that there is a continuing, widespread
persistent pattern of unconstitutional misconduct by the
governmental entity's employees) that would rise to
the-level of deliberate indifference to or tacit
authorization of such conduct.
Id. Therefore, Magistrate Judge Duffy recommended
that Unknown DOC staff, CBM Food Services, and unknown CBM
employees be denied summary judgement as to Dale's First
Amendment claim and Warden Dooley, CBM Correctional Food
Services, Unknown DOC staff, and Unknown CBM employees be
denied summary judgement as to Dale's RLUIPA claim.
Id. at 91.
Court adopted the report and recommendation in part, denying
summary judgment to these defendants as to these claims.
Docket 72. The Court also granted defendants summary judgment
as to Dale's Fourteenth Amendment claim. Id.
Dale was allowed to proceed to the discovery stage on his
discovery deadline was set as April 29, 2016. Docket 76. On
April 20, 2016, Dale filed a motion to compel defendants to
produce a set of documents. Docket 82. Defendants responded,
arguing that they had responded to all of Dale's proper
requests and that the remaining requests were not relevant to
his remaining claims. Docket 86.
27, 2016, defendants filed their second motion for summary
judgment. Docket 90. Defendants argue that the limited
discovery has not produced the identities of defendants
because Dale has not sought this information. Docket 91. Dale
responds, arguing that he has met his burden and that he
sought to amend his complaint in order to add defendants.
judgment is appropriate if the movant "shows that there
is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant
is entitled to judgment as a matter of law."
Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(a). The moving party can meet this burden by
presenting evidence that there is no dispute of material fact
or by showing that the nonmoving party has not presented
evidence to support an element of its case on which it bears
the ultimate burden of proof. Celotex Corp. v.
Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322-23 (1986). To avoid summary
judgment, "[t]he nonmoving party may not rest on mere
allegations or denials, but must demonstrate on the record
the existence of specific facts which create a genuine issue
for trial." Mosley v. City of Northwoods, 415
F.3d 908, 910 (8th Cir. 2005) (citation omitted and quotation
who proceed pro se are entitled to the benefit of liberal
construction at the pleading stage. Quam v. Minnehaha
Cty. Jail, 821 F.2d 522, 522 (8th Cir. 1987).
Nonetheless, the summary judgment standard set forth in Rule
56 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure remains applicable
to prisoners proceeding pro se. Id. The district
court is not required to "plumb the record in order to
find a genuine issue of material fact." Barge v.
Anheuser-Busch, Inc., 87 F.3d 256, 260 (8th Cir. 1996).
Courts must remain sensitive, however, "to the special
problems faced by prisoners attempting to proceed pro se in
vindicating their constitutional rights, and [the Eighth
Circuit does] not approve summary dismissal of such pro se
claims without regard for these special problems."
Nickens v. White, 622 F.2d 967, 971 (8th Cir. 1980).
"When dealing with summary judgment procedures the
technical rigor is inappropriate where . . . uninformed
prisoners are involved." Ross v. Franzen, 777
F.2d 1216, 1219 (7th Cir. 1985).