United States District Court, D. South Dakota, Southern Division
JOSEPH R. FLYING HORSE, Plaintiff,
JAMES HANSEN, Parole Agent, Sued in his Official and Individual Capacities; DOUG CLARK, Supervising Parole Agent, Sued in his Official and Individual Capacities; KRISTA BAST, Case Manager, Sued in her Official and Individual Capacities; SETH HUGHES, Unit Coordinator, Sued in his Official and Individual Capacities; DARIN YOUNG, Warden, of the South Dakota State Penitentiary, Sued in his Official and Individual Capacities; DENNY KAEMINGK, Secretary of Corrections, Sued in his Official and Individual Capacities; MIRANDA WARD, SDSP Case Manager, Sued in her Official and Individual Capacities; RILEY DEGROOT, SDSP Case Manager, Sued in his Official and Individual Capacities; TROY PONTO, SDSP Associate Warden, Sued in his Official and Individual Capacities; DARIK BEIBER, SDSP Unit Manager, Sued in his Official and Individual Capacities; VAL MCGOVERN, Board Staff, Sued in her Official and Individual Capacities; STACY COLE, Board Staff, Sued in her Official and Individual Capacities; KAYLA STUCKY, Board Staff, Sued in his Official and Individual Capacities; ASHLEY MCDONALD, DOC Attorney, Sued in his Official and Individual Capacities; PENNINGTON COUNTY, Respondeat Superior, for Pennington County State's Attorney Office; SOUTH DAKOTA DEPARTMENT OF CORRECTIONS; SOUTH DAKOTA BOARD OF PARDONS AND PAROLES, Defendants.
ORDER DISMISSING COMPLAINT, DENYING MOTION TO APPOINT
COUNSEL, DENYING MOTION FOR DEFAULT JUDGMENT, AND DENYING
MOTION FOR PRELIMINARY INJUNCTION
E. SCHREIER UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE
Joseph R. Flying Horse, is an inmate at the South Dakota
State Penitentiary in Sioux Falls. Flying Horse filed an
amended complaint, moves the court to appoint him counsel,
moves for default judgment and summary judgment, and moves
for a preliminary injunction. For the following reasons, the
court denies Flying Horse's motions and dismisses his
to the complaint, on May 17, 2016, Flying Horse was arrested
in Rapid City for unauthorized possession of controlled drug
or substance. Docket 9 at 1-2. He had a parole detainer
placed on him by his parole officer, James Hansen.
Id. at 2. At his preliminary hearing, Flying Horse
did not accept the court's jurisdiction, and the charges
against him were dropped. Id. He was not released,
however, and was told that the state's attorney planned
on re-charging him. Id. at 3. He was later
transferred to the South Dakota State Penitentiary in Sioux
Horse asked prison officials why he was being detained
without being charged with a crime despite his parole
detainer expiring. Id. at 4-6. He was never provided
a clear answer other than that the state planned on
re-charging him. Id. On August 11, 2016, Case
Manager Miranda Ward asked Flying Horse to sign a Community
Transition Program Self Committal Form, but Flying Horse
refused. Id. at 6-7. The next day, Case Manager
Riley DeGroot asked Flying Horse to sign a CTP form again,
but Flying Horse refused again. Id. at 7. Flying
Horse was told by multiple prison officials that he was being
detained because he had pending charges, but the South Dakota
state court clerk sent him a letter on August 29, 2016,
stating that he did not have any charges pending.
Id. at 8-9.
September 12, 2016, Ward told Flying Horse that if he signed
the CTP form, he would be “on his way” to being
released on parole. Id. at 10. She warned him,
however, that if he did not sign the form, the parole board
would find him in violation of parole. Id. The next
day, Unit Manager Darik Beiber asked Flying Horse to sign a
Parole Detainment Extension Form. Id. at 11. When
Flying Horse refused, he was punished for violating prison
rules. Id. On September 15, 2016, Flying Horse was
served with Parole Violation Papers. Id. The Parole
Board instituted parole revocation proceedings. Id.
August 22, 2016, Flying Horse filed a notice of action.
Docket 1. He filed what he calls his first amended complaint
on November 7, 2016. Docket 9. He alleges that he is being
unlawfully detained and that defendants have violated his Due
Process Rights as well as his rights under the Fourth, Fifth,
Eighth, and Fourteenth Amendments. Docket 9 at 12. In his own
Flying Horse alleges and asserts that both the PO and DOC are
using the Detainer and the provisions of 28 C.F.R. §
2.49(f) . . . as a "Tool" for punishing him because
he chose to exercise his Constitutional right(s) to defend
against the charge brought against him by the state of South
Dakota . . .; whereas, because of his efforts the charge
against him had ultimately dismissed.
court must accept the well-pleaded allegations in the
complaint as true and draw all reasonable inferences in favor
of the non-moving party. Schriener v. Quicken Loans,
Inc., 774 F.3d 442, 444 (8th Cir. 2014). Civil rights
and pro se complaints must be liberally construed.
Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89, 94 (2007) (citation
omitted); Bediako v. Stein Mart, Inc., 354 F.3d 835,
839 (8th Cir. 2004). Even with this construction, “a
pro se complaint must contain specific facts supporting its
conclusions.” Martin v. Sargent, 780 F.2d
1334, 1337 (8th Cir. 1985); Ellis v. City of
Minneapolis, 518 F.App'x 502, 504 (8th Cir. 2013).
Civil rights complaints cannot be merely conclusory.
Davis v. Hall, 992 F.2d 151, 152 (8th Cir. 1993);
Parker v. Porter, 221 F.App'x 481, 482 (8th Cir.
complaint “does not need detailed factual allegations .
. . [but] requires more than labels and conclusions, and a
formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of action
will not do.” Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550
U.S. 544, 555 (2007). “If a plaintiff cannot make the
requisite showing, dismissal is appropriate.”
Abdullah v. Minnesota, 261 F. App'x 926, 927
(8th Cir. 2008); Beavers v. Lockhart, 755 F.2d 657,
663 (8th Cir. 1985). Under 28 U.S.C. § 1915A, the court
must screen prisoner complaints and dismiss them if they are
“(1) frivolous, malicious, or fail to state a claim
upon which relief may be granted; or (2) seek monetary
relief from a defendant who is immune from such
Horse claims that his continuing detention violates his
constitutional rights. It is true “that the Due Process
Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment imposes limits on the
revocation of the conditional liberty enjoyed by persons
serving terms of supervised release.” United States
v. Bennett, 561 F.3d 799, 801 (8th Cir. 2009). The
Supreme Court has set out “minimum due process
requirements for revocation hearings[.]” Id.
at 802. But it appears from Flying Horse's complaint that
he was “in custody” as either a prisoner or a
parolee during the time covered in his complaint, and as such
he could have attacked the ...