Sarah K. Brooks; Michelle R. Bullock; Zoea A. Warnick; Francis Livingood; Paul G. Wolf; Jason Fett Plaintiffs - Appellants
City of Des Moines, Iowa; Gatso USA, Inc. Defendants-Appellees Kris L. Olds Plaintiff
Submitted: November 17, 2016
from United States District Court for the Southern District
of Iowa - Des Moines
LOKEN, BEAM, and BENTON, Circuit Judges.
BENTON, Circuit Judge.
drivers sued the City of Des Moines and Gatso USA, Inc.,
arguing that the Automatic Traffic Enforcement (ATE) system
violates federal and state law. The district court dismissed
the drivers' claims. Having jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C.
§ 1291, this court affirms in part, reverses in part,
2011, the City, by ordinance, authorized an ATE system. Des
Moines, Iowa Mun. Code § 114-243. The City contracted
with Gatso to install and operate the system. When a vehicle
speeds or runs a red light, an ATE camera takes an image.
Gatso then mails a Notice of Violation to the vehicle owner.
The drivers sued in Iowa state court, arguing that the ATE
system violates their right to procedural due process, their
fundamental right to travel, Iowa Code §§ 602.6101
and 364.22, and causes unjust enrichment for the City and
Gatso. They removed the case to federal court and moved to
district court dismissed the drivers for failure to state a
claim. On appeal, the drivers contend that the district court
erred by failing to address their standing and by dismissing
district court "passes the question whether plaintiffs
here have standing to bring the claims." To the
contrary: "Lack of the jurisdiction of the subject
matter of litigation cannot be waived by the parties or
ignored by the court." Hunter v. Underwood, 362
F.3d 468, 476 (8th Cir. 2004). "The appellate court must
satisfy itself not only of its own jurisdiction but also that
of the district court." Id. at 476-77. Where a
plaintiff lacks standing, the court has no subject matter
jurisdiction. Young America Corp. v. Affiliated Comput.
Servs., Inc., 424 F.3d 840, 843 (8th Cir. 2005).
establish Article III standing, a plaintiff must show 1) an
injury in fact, 2) a sufficient causal connection between the
injury and the conduct complained of, and 3) a likelihood
that the injury will be redressed by a favorable decision.
Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 560
(1992). The party invoking federal jurisdiction has the
burden to establish these elements. Id.
drivers received a Notice of Violation, which is sufficient
injury in fact. See Ariz. Right to Life Political Action
Comm. v. Bayless, 320 F.3d 1002, 1006-07 (9th Cir. 2003)
(holding that the plaintiff had standing to challenge a
statute because the state had given no indication that the
law would not be enforced and the plaintiff "faced a
reasonable risk that it would be subject to civil penalties
for violation of the statute"); Horne v. U.S. Dept.
of Agric., 750 F.3d 1128, 1136 (9th Cir. 2014),
rev'd on other grounds, 135 S.Ct. 2419 (2015)
("A monetary penalty is an actual, concrete and
particularized injury-in-fact."). The drivers'
alleged injury is directly traceable to the City and Gatso.
If the court awards damages, their claims are redressed.
See Friends of the Earth, Inc. v. Laidlaw Envtl. Servs.
(TOC), Inc., 528 U.S. 167, 174 (2000). The drivers have
drivers argue that district court should not have relied on
Hughes v. City of Cedar Rapids, 112 F.Supp.3d 817
(N.D. Iowa 2015), because the facts here are materially
different. While the drivers correctly note that the Cedar
Rapids' ordinance is different, any difference is
immaterial. Both Cedar Rapids and Des Moines offer access to
the district court (before or after an optional