United States District Court, D. South Dakota, Western Division
ORDER DISMISSING CASE
JEFFREY L. VIKEN CHIEF JUDGE
28, 2016, plaintiff Jeremiah Little filed a complaint against
defendants pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983. (Docket 1). The
court granted Mr. Little leave to proceed in forma
pauperis and he paid the initial partial filing fee.
((Dockets 9 & 11).
28 U.S.C. § 1915A, the court must review a prisoner
complaint and identify cognizable claims or dismiss the
complaint if it is frivolous, malicious, or fails to state a
claim upon which relief may be granted. This screening
process “applies to all civil complaints filed by [a]
prisoner, regardless of payment of [the] filing fee.”
Lewis v. Estes, 242 F.3d 375 at *1 (8th Cir. 2000)
(unpublished) (citing Carr v. Dvorin, 171 F.3d 115,
116 (2d Cir. 1999)). During this initial screening process,
the court must dismiss the complaint in its entirety or in
part if the complaint is “frivolous, malicious, or
fails to state a claim upon which relief may be
granted” or “seeks monetary relief from a
defendant who is immune from such relief.” 28 U.S.C.
§ 1915A(b). The court may dismiss a complaint under
§§ 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii) and 1915A(b)(1) for failure to
state a claim as “the statute accords judges not only
the authority to dismiss a claim based on an indisputably
meritless legal theory, but also the unusual power to pierce
the veil of the complaint's factual allegations and
dismiss those claims whose factual contentions are clearly
baseless.” Neitzke v. Williams, 490 U.S. 319,
Mr. Little is proceeding pro se, his pleading must
be liberally construed and his complaint, “however
inartfully pleaded, must be held to less stringent standards
than formal pleadings drafted by lawyers.” Erickson
v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89, 94 (2007) (internal quotation
marks and citation omitted). Mr. Little filed an amended
complaint. (Docket 6). The amended complaint, however, is a
photocopy of his original complaint. For this opinion, the
court will cite to the original complaint. Mr. Little used a
Civil Rights Complaint By A Prisoner form. (Docket 1). Under
Section A. Jurisdiction, Mr. Little checked the boxes
asserting jurisdiction under 1(a) 28 U.S.C. §
1343(a)(3); 42 U.S.C. § 1983; and 1(b) 28 U.S.C. §
1331. Id. at p. 1 ¶ (A)(1)(a) and
Little's complaint contains three counts. Counts 1 and 2
raise essentially the same claim. In Counts 1 and 2, Mr.
Little alleges he was housed in the Rapid City Regional
Hospital Regional West Behavior Health Department (“the
hospital”) under the “medical privacy act of
mental health behaviors.” (Docket 1 at p. 4). He
alleges the hospital wrongfully disclosed his confidential
information to the Pennington County Sheriff's Office,
which then seized Mr. Little and imprisoned him. Id.
He alleges he had signed a “privacy act
agreement” which stated the hospital could not disclose
his “confidential behavior health securement.”
Count 3, Mr. Little alleges the defendants violated his
Eighth Amendment rights by interfering with and interrupting
his behavior health treatment. Id. at p. 6. He
alleges he was arrested in the middle of a mental health
assessment and was unable to finish that evaluation.
Request For Relief, Mr. Little asks that he be returned to
the custody of tribal authorities so he can finish mental
health treatment. Id. at p. 7. He seeks money
damages of $500, 000 from each defendant and that damages
also be paid to his children because they did not receive his
support. Id. Finally, he requests that his
delinquent child support payments be quashed. Id.
Little fails to state a claim upon which relief may be
granted. Even with a liberal construction, “a pro se
complaint must contain specific facts supporting its
conclusions.” Martin v. Sargent, 780 F.2d
1334, 1337 (8th Cir. 1985); Ellis v. City of
Minneapolis, 518 F. App'x 502, 504 (8th Cir. 2013).
A complaint “does not need detailed factual allegations
. . . [but] requires more than labels and conclusions, and a
formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of action
will not do.” Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly,
550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007).
Little's complaint fails to meet this standard. He does
not explain which of his constitutional rights were
violated. He mentions the Privileges and Immunities and Equal
Protection Clauses of the Fourteenth Amendment, but does not
explain how these clauses were violated.
Little also fails to explain how his constitutional
rights were violated. While there may be a situation in which
disclosure of medical information violates some
constitutional right, Mr. Little does not explain how that
happened here. “Though pro se complaints are to be
construed liberally, they still must allege sufficient facts
to support the claims advanced.” Stone v.
Harry, 364 F.3d 912, 914 (8th Cir. 2004). The court is
not required to “supply additional facts, nor will [it]
construct a legal theory that assumes facts that have not
been pleaded.” Id. (citing Dunn v.
White, 880 F.2d 1188, 1197 (10th Cir. 1989)). Mr.
Little's claims are dismissed pursuant to 28 U.S.C.
§§ 1915(e)(2)(B)(i) and 1915A(b)(1).
court finds plaintiff's complaint is frivolous and fails
to state a claim upon which relief can be granted. Section
1915(g) states as follows:
In no event shall a prisoner bring a civil action or appeal a
judgment in a civil action or proceeding under this section
if the prisoner has, on 3 or more prior occasions, while
incarcerated or detained in any facility, brought an action
or appeal in a court of the United States that was dismissed
on the grounds that it is frivolous, malicious, or fails to
state a claim upon which relief may be granted, unless the
prisoner is under imminent danger of serious physical injury.
28 U.S.C. § 1915(g). The court previously assessed a
“first strike” against Mr. Little in Little
v. State of South Dakota, et. al, Civ. 14-5069-JLV
(D.S.D. November 17, 2014) (Docket 5 at p. 8). Accordingly,
that, pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §§ 1915(e)(2)(B)(i) and
1915A(b)(1), Mr. Little's complaint (Docket 1) is
dismissed with prejudice as frivolous and for ...