The opinion of the court was delivered by: Veronica L. Duffy United States Magistrate Judge
ORDER GRANTING IN PART AND DENYING IN PART PLAINTIFFS' MOTION TO COMPEL [DOCKET NO. 24]
This matter is before the court on a complaint by plaintiffs Sylvia and Leo Kirschenman, husband and wife, against Auto-Owners Insurance ("Auto-Owners"), alleging breach of contract, bad faith refusal to pay insurance benefits, and unfair trade practices. See Docket No. 1. Jurisdiction is premised on the diverse citizenship of the parties and an amount in controversy in excess of $75,000. See 28 U.S.C. § 1332.
Pending is plaintiffs' motion to compel Auto-Owners to produce certain discovery which plaintiffs requested. See Docket No. 24. The district court, the Honorable Karen E. Schreier, Chief Judge, referred this motion to this magistrate judge for determination pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(A). See Docket No. 38.
The facts alleged by plaintiffs are as follows.*fn1 Plaintiffs are a husband and wife in their 80s. They procured property insurance for their home through Auto-Owners. On May 5, 2007, multiple tornadoes, large hail, and heavy rain struck the area near Gavin's Point dam, just outside of Yankton, South Dakota, where plaintiffs' home is situated.
Plaintiffs' home sustained substantial damage to its roof. Heavy rain poured into the attic and continued the pull of gravity downward through the ceiling panels and inside the walls and window wells of the home. There was a large plastic sheet called a moisture barrier stapled to the rafters in the attic of plaintiffs' home that acted to retard the dissipation of much of the incoming rain water into plaintiffs' home. The moisture barrier became a large bladder, holding water in the attic and resulting in the saturation of the attic insulation and the rafters.
Following the storm, Auto-Owners hired an independent claims adjustor to estimate the cost of repairing the damage to plaintiffs' home. Although the adjustor reported to Auto-Owners that the plaintiffs' roof leaked extensively, he never inspected the attic space or checked the insulation.
Auto-Owners issued the plaintiffs a check for $6,909.80 to cover the cost of replacing shingles on the roof and re-painting the interior ceilings. After these initial repairs were completed, the ceiling panels began sagging in the 23 months after the storm. Plaintiffs reported the sagging ceiling tiles to Auto-Owners, but Auto-Owners did not respond.
In 2009, plaintiffs began noticing signs of mold growing in their house. Plaintiffs contacted the adjuster with a written list of concerns, including plaintiffs' concern that mold was growing and that the insulation was wet. Auto-Owners again did not inspect the attic or the insulation, but estimated the cost of repainting and stapling ceiling panels, replacing wallpaper, and replacing trim boards to be $7,962.60.
Plaintiffs contacted a contractor, who gave them an estimate of $8,602.78 for the visible necessary repairs. However, the contractor told plaintiffs that once the ceiling panels were removed, there might be additional repairs required. The contractor could not be sure what concealed conditions he might find.
In response to plaintiffs' contractor's estimate, Auto-Owners offered to pay plaintiffs the $7,962.60, but conditioned payment on plaintiffs agreeing to release Auto-Owners from any further responsibility in connection with damage from the May 5, 2007, storm. Plaintiffs refused to sign the release, and so Auto-Owners refused to pay the $7,962.60 that it had determined itself to be owing under the policy.
After attempting to get the South Dakota Division of Insurance and the South Dakota Attorney General's Office to help plaintiffs' with their dispute with Auto-Owners, plaintiffs hired and paid for their contractor's services with their own money. When the contractor began work, he found extensive mold and mildew throughout the rafters and insulation in plaintiffs' home.
Thereafter, plaintiffs filed their complaint with this court on December 28, 2009. The instant motion concerns 15 separate document requests that plaintiffs served on Auto-Owners that Auto-Owners either refused to produce documents on, or have limited their production of documents as to.
A. Meet and Confer Requirement
Both the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure and this district's local rules of procedure require that parties meet and confer in an attempt to resolve discovery disputes before filing discovery motions. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 37(a)(1); DSD LR 37.1. A certification must be part of any discovery motion and the certification must show that a good-faith effort was made to resolve disputes before filing the motion. Id. Plaintiffs' counsel asserted in his original brief in support of his motion that he had complied with both the Federal and local rules requiring the parties to try to work out discovery differences between themselves prior to filing a motion to compel.
Counsel for Auto-Owners asserted in his brief in opposition to this motion that plaintiffs' counsel had not complied with the meet-and-confer requirement. Defense counsel characterized plaintiffs' counsel's efforts as a single letter, which did not specifically tell defense counsel what the disputes were with regard to discovery. Defense counsel accused plaintiffs' counsel of filing this motion nine days later after this single, vague "stab" at trying to resolve the matter.
Plaintiffs' reply brief sets forth the entire course of contacts between their counsel and defense counsel and demonstrates a far different course of events. The process began when plaintiffs served Auto-Owners with discovery requests on April 4, 2010, simultaneously proposing a protective order as to any documents produced in response to the discovery requests. On May 14, 2010, Auto-Owners produced documents in response to five of the 27 discovery requests served on them. Thereafter, over the course of 17 months, plaintiffs' counsel wrote or e-mailed defense counsel 12 times attempting to work out the differences between the parties with regard to the discovery requested by plaintiffs and not provided by Auto-Owners. Plaintiffs' counsel also contacted defense counsel by telephone to attempt to resolve their differences. One of plaintiffs' counsel's letters to defense counsel, at defense counsel's request, was a seven-page letter itemizing the issues disputed and explaining why they were disputed. See Docket No. 25-7.
The court notes initially that it is incredible--given this record of contacts by plaintiffs' counsel--that any lawyer could dispute whether plaintiffs had attempted in good faith to resolve this discovery matter prior to filing the instant motion to compel. The court recognizes that plaintiffs' counsel's contacts were primarily with Mr. Hieb and his legal assistant, Kristen Dinger, and the brief in opposition to the motion to compel was written by Zachary Peterson. Nevertheless, Rule 11 imposes on every lawyer who puts his signature on a pleading filed with the court the duty to make reasonable inquiry as to the facts.
Mr. Peterson's failure to ascertain the history of communications between plaintiffs' counsel and Mr. Hieb prior to making the assertion that plaintiffs counsel had not complied with the meet-and-confer requirement falls below the standard required by Rule 11. A simple examination of the correspondence in the Auto-Owners file should have alerted Mr. Peterson to the facts. A simple reading of plaintiffs' attachments to their motion to compel would also have served to inform Mr. Peterson as many of these contacts between counsel were filed with the court in support of the motion to compel. See Docket No. 25.
Moreover, plaintiffs' reply brief--setting forth the above history of contacts between the parties regarding discovery--was filed in this matter on October 12, 2011. It is now February, 2012. Never at any time since plaintiffs' reply brief was filed has Mr. Peterson or any other lawyer on behalf of Auto-Owners retracted their unfounded assertion that plaintiffs' counsel failed to abide by the meet-and-confer requirement. Plaintiffs counsel has affirmatively demonstrated that he has met the requirements of Fed. R. Civ. P. 37(a)(1) and DSD LR 37.1. The court will consider plaintiffs' motion on the merits.
B. Scope of Discovery in a Civil Case
The scope of discovery is governed by Fed. R. Civ. P. 26. The scope described by that rule is as follows:
Unless otherwise limited by court order, the scope of discovery is as follows: Parties may obtain discovery regarding any non-privileged matter that is relevant to any party's claim or defense--including the existence, description, nature, custody, condition, and location of any documents or other tangible things and the identity and location of persons who know of any discoverable matter. For good cause, the court may order discovery of any matter relevant to the subject matter involved in the action. Relevant information need not be admissible at the trial if the discovery appears reasonably calculated to lead to the discovery of admissible evidence. All discovery is subject to the limitations imposed by Rule 26(b)(2)(C).
See Fed. R. Civ. P. 26(b)(1).
This scope of discovery under subsection (b)(1) is limited by subsection (b)(2)(C). That subsection provides that:
On motion or on its own, the court must limit the frequency or extent of discovery otherwise allowed by these rules or by local rule if it determines that:
(i) the discovery sought is unreasonably cumulative or duplicative, or can be obtained from some other source that is more convenient, less burdensome, or less expensive;
(ii) the party seeking discovery has had ample opportunity to obtain the information by discovery in the action; or
(iii) the burden or expense of the proposed discovery outweighs its likely benefit, considering the needs of the case, the amount in controversy, the parties' resources, the importance of the issues at stake in the action, and the importance of the discovery in resolving the issues.
See Fed. R. Civ. P. 26(b)(2)(C).
A party may move for a protective order from discovery upon a demonstration of good cause in order to protect themselves from annoyance, embarrassment, oppression, or undue burden or expense. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 26(c)(1). If a motion for protective order is denied, the court may order that the party provide or permit discovery. Id. at (c)(2). The court may award attorneys fees and expenses in connection with a motion for protective order. Id. at (c)(3); Fed. R. Civ. P. 37(a)(5).
The scope of discovery under Rule 26(b) is extremely broad. See 8 Charles A. Wright & Arthur R. Miller, Federal Practice & Procedure § 2007 (2d ed. 1994) (hereinafter "Wright & Miller"). The reason for the broad scope of discovery is that "[m]utual knowledge of all the relevant facts gathered by both parties is essential to proper litigation. To that end, either party may compel the other to disgorge whatever facts he has in his possession." 8 Wright & Miller, § 2007, 96 (quoting Hickman v. Taylor, 329 U.S. 495, 507-08, 67 S. Ct. 385, 392, 91 L. Ed. 2d 451 (1947)). The Federal Rules distinguish between discoverability and admissibility of evidence. Id. at 95; see also Fed. R. Civ. P. 26(b), 32, and 33. Therefore, the rules of evidence assume the task of keeping out incompetent, unreliable, or prejudicial evidence at trial. These considerations are not inherent barriers to discovery, however.
The advisory committee's note to the 2000 amendments to Rule 26(b)(1) provide guidance on how courts should define the scope of discovery in a particular case:
Under the amended provisions, if there is an objection that discovery goes beyond material relevant to the parties' claims or defenses, the court would become involved to determine whether the discovery is relevant to the claims or defenses and, if not, whether good cause exists for authorizing it so long as it is relevant to the subject matter of the action. The good-cause standard warranting broader discovery is meant to be flexible.
The Committee intends that the parties and the court focus on the actual claims and defenses involved in the action. The dividing line between information relevant to the claims and defenses and that relevant only to the subject matter of the action cannot be defined with precision. A variety of types of information not directly pertinent to the incident in suit could be relevant to the claims or defenses raised in a given action. For example, other incidents of the same type, or involving the same product, could be properly discoverable under the revised standard. ... In each case, the determination whether such information is discoverable because it is relevant to the claims or defenses depends on the circumstances of the pending action.
The rule change signals to the court that it has the authority to confine discovery to the claims and defenses asserted in the pleadings, and signals to the parties that they have no entitlement to discovery to develop new claims or defenses that are not already identified in the pleadings. ... When judicial intervention is invoked, the actual scope of discovery should be determined according to the reasonable needs of the action. The court may permit broader discovery in a particular case depending on the circumstances of the case, the nature of the claims and defenses, and the scope of the discovery requested.
See Fed. R. Civ. P. 26(b)(1) advisory committee's note.
The same advisory committee's note further clarifies that information is discoverable only if it is relevant to the claims or defenses of the case or, upon a showing of good cause, to the subject matter of the case. Id. "Relevancy is to be broadly construed for discovery issues and is not limited to the precise issues set out in the pleadings. Relevancy ... encompass[es] 'any matter that could bear on, or that reasonably could lead to other matter that could bear on, any issue that is or may be in the case.' " E.E.O.C. v. Woodmen of the World Life Ins. Society, 2007 WL 1217919 at *1 (D.Neb. March 15, 2007) (quoting Oppenheimer Fund, Inc. v. Sanders, 437 U.S. 340, 351 (1978)). The party seeking discovery must make a "threshold showing of relevance before production of information, which does not reasonably bear on the issues in the case, is required." Id. (citing Hofer v. Mack Trucks, Inc., 981 F.2d 377, 380 (8th Cir. 1993)). "Mere speculation that information might be useful will not suffice; litigants seeking to compel discovery must describe with a reasonable degree of specificity, the information they hope to obtain and its importance to their case." Id. (citing Cervantes v. Time, Inc., 464 F.2d 986, 994 (8th Cir. 1972)).
Discoverable information itself need not be admissible at trial; rather, "discovery of such material is permitted if reasonably calculated to lead to the discovery of admissible evidence." See Fed. R. Civ. P. 26(b)(1) advisory committee's note.
Once the requesting party has made a threshold showing of relevance, the burden shifts to the party resisting discovery to show specific facts demonstrating that the discovery is not relevant, or how it is overly broad, burdensome, or oppressive. Penford Corp. v. National Union Fire Ins. Co., 265 F.R.D. 430, 433 (N.D. Iowa 2009); St. Paul Reinsurance Co. v. Commercial Financial Corp., 198 F.R.D. 508, 511 (N.D. Iowa 2000). The articulation of mere conclusory objections that something is "overly broad, burdensome, or oppressive," is insufficient to carry the resisting party's burden--that party must make a specific showing of reasons why the relevant discovery should not be had. Cincinnati Ins. Co. v. Fine Home Managers, Inc., 2010 WL 2990118, *1 (E.D. Mo. 2010); Burns v. Imagine Films Entertainment, Inc., 164 F.R.D. 589, 593 (W.D.N.Y. 1996).
The plaintiffs' claims in this lawsuit are breach of contract, bad faith refusal to pay insurance benefits, and unfair trade practices, for which she requests both compensatory and punitive damages. To prove a bad faith cause of action, plaintiffs must show that Auto-Owners had no reasonable basis for denying her insurance benefits, and that they acted with knowledge or a reckless disregard as to the lack of a reasonable basis for the denial of benefits. See Sawyer v. Farm Bureau Mut. Ins. Co., 2000 S.D. 144, ¶ 18, 619 N.W.2d 644, 649.
To prove a prima facie breach of contract claim, plaintiffs must show (1) an enforceable promise, (2) a breach of the promise; and (3) resulting damages. Bertelsen v. Allstate Ins. Co., 2011 S.D. 13, ¶ 22, 796 N.W.2d 685, 694 (citing Bowes Constr. v. ...