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STANDARD OIL COMPANY CALIFORNIA ET AL. v. UNITED STATES

decided: June 13, 1949.

STANDARD OIL COMPANY OF CALIFORNIA ET AL
v.
UNITED STATES



APPEAL FROM THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA.

Vinson, Black, Reed, Frankfurter, Douglas, Murphy, Jackson, Rutledge, Burton

Author: Frankfurter

[ 337 U.S. Page 294]

 MR. JUSTICE FRANKFURTER delivered the opinion of the Court.

This is an appeal to review a decree enjoining the Standard Oil Company of California and its wholly-owned subsidiary, Standard Stations, Inc.,*fn1 from enforcing or entering into exclusive supply contracts with any independent dealer in petroleum products and automobile accessories. 78 F.Supp. 850. The use of such contracts was successfully assailed by the United States as violative of § 1 of the Sherman Act*fn2 and § 3 of the Clayton Act.*fn3

[ 337 U.S. Page 295]

     The Standard Oil Company of California, a Delaware corporation, owns petroleum-producing resources and refining plants in California and sells petroleum products in what has been termed in these proceedings the "Western area" -- Arizona, California, Idaho, Nevada, Oregon, Utah and Washington. It sells through its own service stations, to the operators of independent service stations, and to industrial users. It is the largest seller of gasoline in the area. In 1946 its combined sales amounted to 23% of the total taxable gallonage sold there in that year: sales by company-owned service stations constituted 6.8% of the total, sales under exclusive dealing contracts with independent service stations, 6.7% of the total; the remainder were sales to industrial users. Retail service-station sales by Standard's six leading competitors absorbed 42.5% of the total taxable gallonage; the remaining retail sales were divided between more than seventy small companies. It is undisputed that Standard's major competitors employ similar exclusive dealing arrangements. In 1948 only 1.6% of retail outlets were what is known as "split-pump" stations, that is, sold the gasoline of more than one supplier.

Exclusive supply contracts with Standard had been entered into, as of March 12, 1947, by the operators of 5,937 independent stations, or 16% of the retail gasoline outlets in the Western area, which purchased from Standard in 1947, $57,646,233 worth of gasoline and

[ 337 U.S. Page 296]

     $8,200,089.21 worth of other products. Some outlets are covered by more than one contract so that in all about 8,000 exclusive supply contracts are here in issue. These are of several types, but a feature common to each is the dealer's undertaking to purchase from Standard all his requirements of one or more products. Two types, covering 2,777 outlets, bind the dealer to purchase of Standard all his requirements of gasoline and other petroleum products as well as tires, tubes, and batteries. The remaining written agreements, 4,368 in number, bind the dealer to purchase of Standard all his requirements of petroleum products only. It was also found that independent dealers had entered 742 oral contracts by which they agreed to sell only Standard's gasoline. In some instances dealers who contracted to purchase from Standard all their requirements of tires, tubes, and batteries, had also orally agreed to purchase of Standard their requirements of other automobile accessories. Of the written agreements, 2,712 were for varying specified terms; the rest were effective from year to year but terminable "at the end of the first 6 months of any contract year, or at the end of any such year, by giving to the other at least 30 days prior thereto written notice . . . ." Before 1934 Standard's sales of petroleum products through independent service stations were made pursuant to agency agreements, but in that year Standard adopted the first of its several requirements-purchase contract forms, and by 1938 requirements contracts had wholly superseded the agency method of distribution.

Between 1936 and 1946 Standard's sales of gasoline through independent dealers remained at a practically constant proportion of the area's total sales; its sales of lubricating oil declined slightly during that period from 6.2% to 5% of the total. Its proportionate sales of tires and batteries for 1946 were slightly higher than they were in 1936, though somewhat lower than for some

[ 337 U.S. Page 297]

     intervening years; they have never, as to either of these products, exceeded 2% of the total sales in the Western area.

Since § 3 of the Clayton Act was directed to prohibiting specific practices even though not covered by the broad terms of the Sherman Act,*fn4 it is appropriate to consider first whether the enjoined contracts fall within the prohibition of the narrower Act. The relevant provisions of § 3 are:

"It shall be unlawful for any person engaged in commerce, in the course of such commerce, to lease or make a sale or contract for sale of goods, wares, merchandise, machinery, supplies, or other commodities, whether patented or unpatented, for use, consumption, or resale within the United States . . . on the condition, agreement, or understanding that the lessee or purchaser thereof shall not use or deal in the goods . . . of a competitor or competitors of the . . . seller, where the effect of such lease, sale, or contract for sale or such condition, agreement, or understanding may be to substantially lessen competition or tend to create a monopoly in any line of commerce."

Obviously the contracts here at issue would be proscribed if § 3 stopped short of the qualifying clause beginning, "where the effect of such lease, sale, or contract

[ 337 U.S. Page 298]

     for sale . . . ." If effect is to be given that clause, however, it is by no means obvious, in view of Standard's minority share of the "line of commerce" involved, of the fact that that share has not recently increased, and of the claims of these contracts to economic utility, that the effect of the contracts may be to lessen competition or tend to create a monopoly. It is the qualifying clause, therefore, which must be construed.

The District Court held that the requirement of showing an actual or potential lessening of competition or a tendency to establish monopoly was adequately met by proof that the contracts covered "a substantial number of outlets and a substantial amount of products, whether considered comparatively or not." 78 F.Supp. at 875. Given such quantitative substantiality, the substantial lessening of competition -- so the court reasoned -- is an automatic result, for the very existence of such contracts denies dealers opportunity to deal in the products of competing suppliers and excludes suppliers from access to the outlets controlled by those dealers. Having adopted this standard of proof, the court excluded as immaterial testimony bearing on "the economic merits or demerits of the present system as contrasted with a system which prevailed prior to its establishment and which would prevail if the court declared the present arrangement [invalid]." The court likewise deemed it unnecessary to make findings, on the basis of evidence that was admitted, whether the number of Standard's competitors had increased or decreased since the inauguration of the requirements-contract system, whether the number of their dealers had increased or decreased, and as to other matters which would have shed light on the comparative status of Standard and its competitors before and after the adoption of that system. The court concluded:

"Grant that, on a comparative basis, and in relation to the entire trade in these products in the area,

[ 337 U.S. Page 299]

     the restraint is not integral. Admit also that control of distribution results in lessening of costs and that its abandonment might increase costs. . . . Concede further, that the arrangement was entered into in good faith, with the honest belief that control of distribution and consequent concentration of representation were economically beneficial to the industry and to the public, that they have continued for over fifteen years openly, notoriously and unmolested by the Government, and have been practiced by other major oil companies competing with Standard, that the number of Standard outlets so controlled may have decreased, and the quantity of products supplied to them may have declined, on a comparative basis. Nevertheless, as I read the latest cases of the Supreme Court, I am compelled to find the practices here involved to be violative of both statutes. For they affect injuriously a sizeable part of interstate commerce, or, -- to use the current phrase, -- 'an appreciable segment' of interstate commerce."

The issue before us, therefore, is whether the requirement of showing that the effect of the agreements "may be to substantially lessen competition" may be met simply by proof that a substantial portion of commerce is affected or whether it must also be demonstrated that competitive activity has actually diminished or probably will diminish.*fn5

[ 337 U.S. Page 300]

     Since the Clayton Act became effective, this Court has passed on the applicability of § 3 in eight cases, in five of which it upheld determinations that the challenged agreement was violative of that Section. Three of these -- United Shoe Machinery Corp. v. United States, 258 U.S. 451; International Business Machines Corp. v. United States, 298 U.S. 131; International Salt Co. v. United States, 332 U.S. 392 -- involved contracts tying to the use of a patented article all purchases of an unpatented product used in connection with the patented article. The other two cases -- Standard Fashion Co. v. Magrane-Houston Co., 258 U.S. 346; Fashion Originators' Guild v. Federal Trade Comm'n, 312 U.S. 457 -- involved requirements contracts not unlike those here in issue.

The Standard Fashion case, the first of the five holding that the Act had been violated, settled one question of interpretation of § 3. The Court said:

"Section 3 condemns sales or agreements where the effect of such sale or contract of sale 'may' be to substantially lessen competition or tend to create monopoly. . . . But we do not think that the purpose in using the word 'may' was to prohibit the mere possibility of the consequences described. It was intended to prevent such agreements as would under the circumstances disclosed probably lessen competition, or create an actual tendency to monopoly." 258 U.S. at 356-57. See also Federal Trade Comm'n v. Morton Salt Co., 334 U.S. 37, 46, n. 14.

[ 337 U.S. Page 301]

     The Court went on to add that the fact that the Section "was not intended to reach every remote lessening of competition is shown in the requirement that such lessening must be substantial," but because it deemed the finding of two lower courts that the contracts in question did substantially lessen competition and tend to create monopoly amply supported by evidence that the defendant controlled two-fifths of the nation's pattern agencies, it did not pause to indicate where the line between a "remote" and a "substantial" lessening should be drawn.

All but one of the later cases also regarded domination of the market as sufficient in itself to support the inference that competition had been or probably would be lessened. In the United Shoe Machinery case, referring, inter alia, to the clause incorporated in all United's leases of patented machinery requiring the use by the lessee of materials supplied by United, the Court observed:

"That such restrictive and tying agreements must necessarily lessen competition and tend to monopoly is, we believe, . . . apparent. When it is considered that the United Company occupies a dominating position in supplying shoe machinery of the classes involved, these covenants signed by the lessee and binding upon him effectually prevent him from acquiring the machinery of a competitor of the lessor except at the risk of forfeiting the right to use the machines furnished by the United Company which may be absolutely essential to the prosecution and success of his business." 258 U.S. at 457-58.

In the International Business Machines case, the defendants were the sole manufacturers of a patented tabulating machine requiring the use of unpatented cards. The lessees of the machines were bound by tying clauses to use in them only the cards supplied by the defendants,

[ 337 U.S. Page 302]

     who, between them, divided the whole of the $3,000,000 annual gross of this business also. The Court concluded:

"These facts, and others, which we do not stop to enumerate, can leave no doubt that the effect of the condition in appellant's leases 'may be to substantially lessen competition,' and that it tends to create monopoly, and has in fact been an important and effective step in the creation of monopoly." 298 U.S. at 136.

The Fashion Originators' Guild case involved an association of dress manufacturers which sold more than 60% of all but the cheapest women's garments. In rejecting the relevance of evidence that the Guild's use of requirements contracts was a "reasonable and necessary" measure of protection against "the devastating evils growing from the pirating of original designs," the Court again emphasized the presence and the consequences of economic power:

"The purpose and object of this combination, its potential power, its tendency to monopoly, the coercion it could and did practice upon a rival method of competition, all brought it within the policy of the prohibition ...


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