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NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD v. DONNELLY GARMENT CO. ET AL.

decided: March 3, 1947.

NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
v.
DONNELLY GARMENT CO. ET AL.



CERTIORARI TO THE CIRCUIT COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE EIGHTH CIRCUIT.*fn*

Vinson, Black, Reed, Frankfurter, Douglas, Murphy, Jackson, Rutledge, Burton

Author: Frankfurter

[ 330 U.S. Page 221]

 MR. JUSTICE FRANKFURTER delivered the opinion of the Court.

On March 6, 1940, the National Labor Relations Board, on finding that the Donnelly Garment Company had engaged in labor practices condemned as "unfair" by the

[ 330 U.S. Page 222]

     Wagner Act, issued an order against the Company "to effectuate the policies" of the Act. The Circuit Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit denied enforcement of the order and remanded the case to the Board. 123 F.2d 215. After carrying out what it conceived to be the directions of the Court, the Board again found against the Company. The Court below denied enforcement of the Board's second order "for want of due process in the proceedings upon which the order is based." 151 F.2d 854, 875. The correctness of this ruling is now before us, for we brought the case here, 327 U.S. 775, to rule on important issues in the administration of the Wagner Act. This protracted litigation has given rise to a swarm of questions. In view of the fact that the case comes to us after it has been twice before the Board and three times before the court below, on a record of thirteen volumes with a total of more than 5000 pages, even an earnest attempt at compactness cannot avoid a somewhat extended opinion.

The case presents limited legal phases of one of those bitter, unedifying conflicts with which American industrial history is unfortunately replete. For other litigation growing out of this strife, see 20 F.Supp. 767; 21 F.Supp. 807; 304 U.S. 243; 23 F.Supp. 998; 99 F.2d 309; 119 F.2d 892; 121 F.2d 561; 47 F.Supp. 61; 47 F.Supp. 65; 47 F.Supp. 67; 55 F.Supp. 572; 55 F.Supp. 587; 147 F.2d 246; 154 F.2d 38. It has its roots in a campaign by the International Ladies' Garment Workers' Union (hereafter designated as International) to unionize the women's garment industry in Kansas City, Missouri. Because of its importance, the Donnelly Garment Company (to be called Company for short) became the particular target of these unionizing efforts. These continued with varying intensity over a period of years but met with little success among the Company's employees.

[ 330 U.S. Page 223]

     In 1938, International began proceedings before the Board charging the Company with a series of unfair labor practices in violation of § 8 (1), (2), (3) of the National Labor Relations Act, 49 Stat. 449, 29 U. S. C. §§ 151 et seq. The main charge was that the Company, to counteract the efforts of International, had stimulated the formation of a plant union, the Donnelly Garment Workers' Union (hereafter called Union) and had dominated it through financial and other aid. Following the usual procedure there was a hearing before a trial examiner. At the hearing, the Examiner rejected an offer by the Company to prove, through the testimony of 1200 employees, that they had not been coerced by the Company to join Union, but that each of them had done so of his own free will, and that they had no knowledge of Company influence in the affairs of Union. The Examiner also excluded evidence to show that the formation of the Union followed strike threats and violence by International, successful against smaller competitors of the Company, to coerce the Company into a closed-shop agreement with International. To these and other less important exclusions the Company duly excepted on the submission of the Trial Examiner's intermediate report. The Board upheld the Examiner's rulings on evidence, accepted his findings of fact, and, with a qualification not here relevant, adopted his recommendations. Thereupon it issued the usual cease-and-desist order, and directed the disestablishment of Union and reimbursement to employees of the amount of the dues which the Company had checked off on behalf of Union (21 N. L. R. B. 164).

Review of this order came before the Circuit Court of Appeals on the Company's petition to set it aside and on the Board's cross-petition for its enforcement. On several contentions, the disposition of which is relevant to

[ 330 U.S. Page 224]

     the questions now calling for decision, the Court sustained the Board. It found no basis for setting aside the proceedings as unfair on the claim that either the Examiner or the Board was biased. It held that the Board properly limited the evidence to issues raised by the complaint, and since International was not on trial it found no impropriety in the exclusion of evidence offered to prove its misconduct. The Court did however find that the Company had been denied a fair hearing in not being allowed to present the testimony of its employees to the effect that Union was truly independent and that they had joined it voluntarily. The Court remanded the case to the Board "for further proceedings not inconsistent with the opinion of this Court."

The Board thereupon set the case for a second hearing before the original Examiner. Insisting that he was biased and had prejudged as valueless "the evidence to be adduced at the pending hearing," the Company moved for a new trial examiner. The Board denied the application and the case proceeded to hearing. This time the Examiner heard eleven of the 1200 employees named in the offer of proof rejected in the earlier proceeding, but declined to hear the rest on the ground that their testimony would be merely cumulative. He allowed the President of the Company, whom illness had kept from the earlier hearing, to testify fully. Otherwise, he received no evidence that had been available but was not offered at the earlier proceeding, and excluded all evidence of events subsequent to the termination of the first hearing. The Examiner's findings and recommendations, in respects here material, were substantially the same as those he had previously made, and the Board, acting upon his intermediate report, issued virtually the same order. 50 N. L. R. B. 241. The Company again petitioned the Circuit Court of Appeals to set aside the order, and the Board again requested its enforcement.

[ 330 U.S. Page 225]

     During the pendency of these proceedings, the Company invoked § 10 (e) of the Wagner Act and asked the Court leave to adduce before the Board evidence which it claimed had been erroneously excluded. This motion was not granted. Instead, as already noted, the Court denied the Board's petition for enforcement "for want of due process in the proceedings upon which the order is based." 151 F.2d 854, 875. The Court set forth its views in a careful opinion of more than thirty pages in the printed record. There was also a concurring opinion, and a dissent.

The Court canvassed many items of evidence. As to some of the Board's rulings which it disapproved, the Court stated explicitly that by themselves they would not have afforded sufficient ground for reversal. Rulings which individually would not invalidate an order of the Board do not in combination acquire the necessary strength to undo what the Board, acting under authority given it by Congress, has done. We do not find that in their combination these rulings amounted to unfairness. We must therefore consider one by one those objections which the Court deemed sufficient to vitiate the Board's order. For the Court below did not suggest that the Board as a tribunal was so biased as to be incapable of fair judgment in this case. It found that such a finding against the Board was not justified.

First. The controlling basis of the Court's finding of unfairness in the Board proceedings related to testimony proffered by the Company at the second hearing before the Examiner. This second hearing was not a new proceeding. It was a stage in a process consisting of the first proceeding before the Board, the remand resulting from review of the Board's order in the Circuit Court of Appeals, and the second proceeding before the ...


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