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CARLOS F. ROSES.

decided: May 14, 1900.

THE CARLOS F. ROSES.


APPEAL FROM THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE UNITED STATES FOR THE SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF FLORIDA.

Author: Fuller

[ 177 U.S. Page 661]

 MR. CHIEF JUSTICE FULLER, after stating the case, delivered the opinion of the court.

The President's proclamation of April 26, 1898, declared the policy of the government in the conduct of the war would be to adhere to the rules of the Declaration of Paris therein set forth, one of them being thus expressed: "Neutral goods, not contraband of war, are not liable to confiscation under the enemy's flag."

The question is whether this cargo when captured was enemy property or not. The District Court held that both the title and right of possession were in these neutral claimants at the time of the capture, "as evidenced by the indorsed bills of lading and the paid bills of exchange," and, therefore, entered the decree in claimant's favor. As the vessel was an enemy vessel the presumption was that the cargo was enemy's property, and this could only be overcome by clear and positive evidence to the contrary. The burden of proving ownership rested on claimants. The London Packet, 5 Wheat. 132; The Sally Magee, 3 Wall. 451; The Benito Estenger, 176 U.S. 568.

Further proofs on claimant's behalf were ordered to be furnished within sixty days from June 2; and the time was enlarged to August 31; and again to October 15. The proofs

[ 177 U.S. Page 662]

     tendered were three affidavits of claimants' manager sworn to September 27, October 12 and October 21, 1898, respectively, with accompanying papers. Such ex parte statements, where further proofs have been ordered, though admitted without objection, are obviously open to criticism, but without pausing to comment on these in that aspect, we inquire whether they satisfy the requirements of the law of prize in respect of the establishment of the neutral character of this cargo under the circumstances.

[ 20 S. Ct. Page ]

     Gibernau and Company were citizens of a neutral state; they were evidently commission merchants, and in each invoice a charge for their commission on the shipment appears. The invoices expressly provided that the goods were shipped "to order for account and risk and by order of the parties noted below." The consignees noted below in the invoice of the jerked beef were the owners of the vessel, "the expedition or voyage of the 'Carlos F. Roses'" and "Mr. Pedro Pages of Havana," all Spanish subjects. The consignees of the garlic were "Mr. Pedro Pages" and "the undersigned;" that is, Gibernau and Company. There were three sets of bills of lading issued by the master to Gibernau and Company. One covered the portion of the shipment of jerked beef made for the account of the vessel; another, the portion of that shipment made for the account count of Pages; the third, the shipment of garlic made for the joint account of Pages and Gibernau and Company. All the bills set forth that the goods were taken for the account and at the risk of whom it might concern. The ship's manifest was signed under date March 15, and the destination of the cargo was stated thus: "Shipped by Pla Gibernau Co. To order." The vise of the consul of Spain, dated the day before, was: "Good for Havana, with a cargo of jerked beef and garlic." As the vessel had a share in the shipment of the jerked beef, and the consignees were named in the invoices, which set forth that the shipments were made by their orders for their account and at their risk, it would appear that the manifest was erroneous, and this and the fact that the bills of lading stated that the goods were taken "for account of whom it may concern," should be especially noted, since the reasonable inference is

[ 177 U.S. Page 663]

     that the consignees must have been known to the master. And it also should be observed that there was no charter party, which would have necessarily revealed the engagements of the vessel, but which naturally would not be entered into if the commercial venture was that of her owner. The general rule is that a consignor on delivering goods ordered, to a master of a ship, delivers them to him as the agent of the consignee so that the property in them is vested in the latter from the moment of such delivery, though the rule may be departed from by agreement or by a particular trade custom, whereby the goods are shipped as belonging to the consignor and on his account and risk. We think that on the face of the papers it must be concluded that when these goods were delivered to the vessel they became the property of the consignees named in the invoices. Hence the shipments of jerked beef must be regarded as owned by Pages, or by him and the owners of the Carlos F. Roses. One half of the garlic belonged to Pages, the remaining half was consigned to Gibernau and Company, and they did not claim, and have not claimed it, nor was it asserted that Gibernau and Company retained the ownership of any part of the cargo after its delivery to the vessel. Property so long unclaimed may be treated as in any view good prize. The Adeline, 9 Cranch, 244; The Harrison, 1 Wheat. 298. In fact, claimants admit that the whole cargo "was ultimately destined for Don Pedro Pages of Havana." The bill of exchange drawn by Gibernau and Company named Kleinwort Sons and Company as acceptors, and directed them to charge the amount to the account of "Pedro Pages of Havana as per advice." The bill drawn by Maristany also named Kleinwort Sons and Company as drawees, and directed them to charge the amount "to P. Roses Valenti of Barcelona as per advice." In neither of them was there any reference to the cargo, and, so far as appeared, the amounts were at once charged up to the persons named.

Harcke said that when the bills of exchange were accepted by Kleinwort Sons and Company bills of lading covering the shipment of 110,256 kilos of jerked beef and of the garlic were delivered to them in consideration of the acceptance of the

[ 177 U.S. Page 664]

     draft for $: 2714 13 8, and that bills of lading for the 165,354 kilos of jerked beef were afterwards delivered in consideration of the acceptance of the draft for $: 3583 11 6. But the date of the latter delivery was not given, and it affirmatively appeared that whenever these bills of lading reached Kleinwort Sons and Company they were retained "pending the disposal of the cargo." Both drafts were accepted April 6, and the bills of lading for the 110,256 kilos of jerked beef and for the garlic were forwarded to Gelak and Company on April 9, but the bills for the 165,384 kilos of jerked beef, whenever received, never were. The instructions to Gelak and Company were not put in evidence, nor any of the correspondence with Valenti or Pages. In June, Gelak and Company cabled that the bills sent to them had not been received; in September they turned up, but no information was afforded as to how they came into Gelak and Company's possession; and in October duplicates were also received by claimants from Gelak and Company, with, so far as disclosed, no accompanying explanation. And Harcke's affidavits failed to set forth the relations, transactions or correspondence existing and passing between claimants and the enemy owners of the cargo. This, although, as Sir William Scott said in The Magnus, 1 C. Rob. 31, "the correspondence of the parties, the orders for purchase, and the mode of payment, would have been the points to which the court would have looked for satisfaction."

[ 20 S. Ct. Page ]

     The affidavits alleged that claimants were wholly unindemnified except by the proceeds of the cargo and the insurance thereon, by which the insurers were subrogated to their own rights, but did not state whether the insurance contemplated a war risk, or why the bills of lading for the larger portion of the beef were retained by claimants and not sent to their Havana agents, or whether they retained them upon instructions from the enemy owners; or whether they came to claimants from Spain; nor did anything appear in respect of the interest of Pages as consignee for himself, or in a representative capacity; nor of Valenti, the owner of the enemy vessel, who resided at Barcelona. The evidence of enemy interest arising on the face of the documents called on the asserted neutral owners to prove

[ 177 U.S. Page 665]

     beyond question their right and title. And still for all that appears, the documents may have been sent merely to facilitate delivery to the agent of the enemy owners.

Bills of lading stand as the substitute and representative of the goods described therein, and while quasi negotiable instruments, are not negotiable in the full sense in which that term is applied to bills and notes. The transfer of the bill passes to the transferee the transferor's title to the goods described, and the presumption as to ownership arising from the bill may be explained or rebutted by other evidence showing where the real ownership lies. A pledgee to whom a bill of lading is given as security gets the legal title to the goods and the right of possession only if such is the intention of the parties, and that intention is open to explanation. Inquiry into the transaction in which the bill originated is not precluded because it came into the hands of persons who may have innocently paid value for it. Pollard v. Vintion, 105 U.S. 7; Shaw v. Railroad Company, 101 U.S. 557.

Generally speaking, in the purchase and shipment of goods on bills of lading attached to bills of exchange drawn against them, the bill of exchange is drawn on the consignee and purchaser, and sent forward for collection through the banker at the place of shipment, who advances on the draft, and thereafter realizes on it through his correspondents, or by sale as exchange; or the banker at some other point, or at the general exchange center, may be the drawee of the bill of exchange instead of the consignee or real owner, the banker standing in the place of the owner, in virtue of some arrangement with his customer, or on the faith of a running account, the pledge of other securities, or the customer's personal liability, so that the draft may be charged up at once, and, at all events, the control of the goods is not the sole reliance of the banker.

In the case in hand, the captors succeeded to the enemy owners' rights, and could have introduced evidence as to the real nature of the transactions, and so have rebutted any presumption in favor of the bankers as purchasers for value, and although they did not do this, the question still remains that in prize courts it is necessary for claimants to show the absence of anything

[ 177 U.S. Page 666]

     to impeach the transaction, and at least to disclose fully all the surrounding circumstances. And this we think claimants have failed to do.

The right of capture acts on the proprietary interest of the thing captured at the time of the capture and is not affected by the secret liens or private engagements of the parties. Hence the prize courts have rejected in its favor the lien of bottomry bonds, of mortgages, for supplies, and of bills of lading. The assignment of bills of lading transfers the jus ad rem, but not necessarily the jus in rem. The jus in re or in rem implies the absolute dominion, -- the ownership independently of any particular relation with another person. The jus ad rem has for its foundation an obligation incurred by another. Sand. Inst. Just. Introd., xviii; 2 Marcade, Expl. du Code Napoleon, 350; 2 Bouvier, (Rawle's Revision,) 73; The Young Mechanic, 2 Curtis, 404.

Claimants did not obtain the jus in rem, and, according to the great weight of authority, the right of capture was superior.

In The Frances, 8 Cranch, 418, a New York merchant claimed two shipments of goods, one in consequence of an advance made to enemy shippers by him in consideration of the consignment, and the other in virtue of a general balance of account due to him from the shippers as their factor. Both consignments were at the risk of the enemy shippers. The goods were condemned as enemy property, and the sentence was affirmed. This court said:

"The doctrine of liens seems to depend chiefly upon the rules of jurisprudence established in different countries. There is no doubt but that, agreeably to the principles of the common law of England, a factor has a lien upon the goods of his principal in his possession, for the balance of account due to him; and so has a consignee for advances made by him to the consignor. . . . But this doctrine is unknown in prize courts, unless in very peculiar cases, where the lien is imposed by a general law of the mercantile world, independent of any contract between the parties. Such is the case of freight upon enemies' goods seized in the vessel of a friend, which is always decreed to the owner of the vessel. . . . But in cases of liens created by

[ 177 U.S. Page 667]

     the mere private contract of individuals, depending upon the different laws of different countries, the difficulties which an examination of such claims would impose upon the captors, and even upon the prize courts, in deciding upon them, and the door which such a doctrine would open to collusion between the enemy owners of the property and neutral claimants, have excluded such cases from the consideration of those courts. . . . The principal strength of the argument in favor of the claimant in this case, seemed to be rested upon the position, that the consignor in this case could not have countermanded the consignment after delivery of the goods to the master of the vessel; and hence it was inferred that the captor had no right to intercept the passage of the property to the consignee. This doctrine would be well founded, if the goods had been sent to the claimant upon his account and risk, except in the case of insolvency. But when goods are sent upon the account and risk of the shipper, the delivery to the master is a delivery to him as agent of the shipper, not of the consignee; and it is competent to the consignor, at any time before actual delivery to the consignee, to countermand it, and thus to prevent his lien from attaching. Upon the whole, the court is of opinion that, upon the reason of the case, as well as upon authority, this claim cannot be supported, and that the sentence of the court below must be affirmed with costs."

In The Mary and Susan, 1 Wheat. 25, an American merchantman bound from Liverpool to New York was captured by a privateer of the United States during the war of 1812. In her cargo were certain goods which had been shipped by British subjects to citizens of the United States, in pursuance of orders received before the declaration of war. Previous to the execution of the orders the shippers became embarrassed, and assigned the goods to certain bankers to secure advances made by them, with a request to the consignees to remit the amount to the bankers, who also repeated the same request, the invoices being for gain and risk of the consignees, and stating the goods to be then the property of the bankers, and it was held that the goods having been purchased and shipped in pursuance of orders from the consignees, the property was originally vested in them,

[ 177 U.S. Page 668]

     and was not divested by the intermediate assignment, which was merely intended to transfer the right to the debt due from the consignees.

In The Hampton, 5 Wall. 372, the schooner Hampton and her cargo had been captured, libelled and condemned as prize of war. The master of the vessel was her owner, but interposed no claim; nor did any one claim the cargo. One Brinckley appeared and claimed the vessel as mortgagee. The bona fides of this mortgage was not disputed; nor that he was a loyal citizen. But his claim was dismissed, and, the case having been certified to this court, it was held that in proceedings in prize, and under the principles of international law, mortgages on vessels captured jure belli are to be treated only as liens subject to be overridden by the capture. Mr. Justice Miller said:

"The ground on which appellant relies is, that the mortgage, being a jus in re held by an innocent party, is something more than a mere lien, and is protected by the law of nations. The mortgagee was not in possession in this case, and the real owner who was in possession admits that his vessel was in delicto by failing to set up any claim for her. It would require pretty strong authority to induce us to import into the prize courts the strict common law doctrine, which is sometimes applied to the relation of a mortgagee to the property mortgaged. It is certainly much more in accordance with the liberal principles which govern admiralty courts to treat mortgages as equity courts treat them, as a mere security for the debt for which they are given, and therefore no more than a lien on the property conveyed. But it is unnecessary to examine this question minutely, because an obvious principle of necessity must forbid a prize court from recognizing the doctrine here contended for. If it were once admitted in these courts, there would be an end of all prize condemnation. As soon as a war was threatened, the owners of vessels and cargoes which might be so situated as to be subject to capture, would only have to raise a sufficient sum of money on them, by bona fide mortgages, to indemnify them in case of such capture. If the vessel or cargo was seized, the owner need not appear, because he would be indifferent, having the value of his property in his

[ 177 U.S. Page 669]

     hands already. The mortgagee having an honest mortgage which he could establish in a court of prize, would either have the property restored to him or get the amount of the mortgage out of the proceeds of the sale. The only risk run by enemy vessels or cargoes on the high seas, or by neutrals engaged in an effort to break the blockade, would be the costs and expenses of capture and condemnation, a risk too unimportant to be of any value to a belligerent in reducing his opponent to terms. The principle which thus abolishes the entire value of prize capture on the high seas, and deprives blockades of all danger to parties disposed to break them, cannot be recognized as a rule of prize courts."

In The Battle, 6 Wall. 498, the steamer Battle and cargo were captured on the high seas as prize of war, brought into port and condemned, for breach of blockade and also as enemy property. Two claims were set up against the steamer in the court below, one for supplies, and another for materials, furnished, and for work and labor in building a cabin on the boat. These claims were dismissed, and the decree affirmed by this court, Mr. Justice Nelson delivering the opinion, saying: "The principle is too well settled that capture as prize of war, jure belli, overrides all previous liens, to require examination."

Such is the rule in the British prize courts. The Tobago, 5 C. Rob. 218; The Marianna, 6 C. Rob. 24; The Ida, Spinks Prize Cases, 26.

The Tobago was a case of claim to a captured French vessel, made on behalf of a British merchant as the holder of a bottomry bond executed and delivered to him by the master of the ship before the commencement of hostilities between Great Britain and France. Sir William Scott said:

"The integrity of this transaction is not impeached, but I am called upon to consider whether the court can, consistently with the principles of law that govern its practice, afford relief. It is the case of a bottomry bond, given fairly in times of peace, without any view of infringing the rights of war, to relieve a ship in distress. . . . But can the court recognize bonds of this kind as titles of property, so as to give persons a right to stand in judgment, and demand restitution of such interests in

[ 177 U.S. Page 670]

     a court of prize? . . . The person advancing money on bonds of this nature, acquires, by that act, no property in the vessel; he acquires the jus in rem, but not the jus in re, until it has been converted and appropriated by the final process of a court of justice. . . . But it is said that the captor takes cum onere, and, therefore, that this obligation would devolve upon him. That he is held to take cum onere is undoubtedly true, as a rule which is to be understood to apply where the onus is immediately and visibly incumbent upon it. A captor who takes the cargo of an enemy on board the ship of a friend, takes it liable to the freight due to the owner of the ship; because the owner of the ship has the cargo in his possession, subject to that demand by the general law, independent of all contract. . . . But it is a proposition of a much wider extent, which affirms that a mere right of action is entitled to the same favorable consideration in its transfer from a neutral to a captor. It is very obvious that claims of such a nature may be so framed as that no powers belonging to this court can enable it to examine them with effect. They are private contracts, passing between parties who may have an interest in colluding; the captor has no access whatever to the original private understanding of the parties in forming such contracts; and it is, therefore, unfit that he should be affected by them. His rights of capture act upon the property, without regard to secret liens possessed by third parties. . . . I am of opinion that there is no instance in which the court has recognized bonds of this kind as titles of property, and that they are not entitled to be recognized as such in the prize courts."

In The Marianna, the vessel had been sold at Buenos Ayres by American owners to a Spanish merchant; the purchase money, however, had not been paid in full, but was to be satisfied out of the proceeds of a quantity of tallow on board the vessel for sale, consigned to the agents of the American vendors at London. The vessel was seized on her voyage to England, documented as belonging to a Spanish merchant, and sailing under the flag and pass of Spain. The former American proprietors made claim to the cargo, but the claim was

[ 177 U.S. Page 671]

     disallowed because the claimants' interest was not sufficient to support it; and the court said:

"Captors are supposed to lay their hands on the gross tangible property, on which there may be many just claims outstanding, between other parties, which can have no operation as to them. If such a rule did not exist, it would be quite impossible for captors to know upon what grounds they were proceeding to make any seizure. The fairest and most credible documents, declaring the property to belong to the enemy, would only serve to mislead them, if such documents were liable to be overruled by liens which could not in any manner come to their knowledge. It would be equally impossible for the court, which has to decide upon the question of property, to admit such considerations. The doctrine of liens depends very much on the particular rules of jurisprudence which prevail in different countries. To decide judicially on such claims, would require of the court a perfect knowledge of the law of covenant, and the application of that law in all countries, under all the diversities in which that law exists. From necessity, therefore, the court would be obliged to shut the door against such discussions and to decide on the simple title of property, with scarcely any exceptions. . . . As to the title of property in the goods, which are said to have been going as the funds out of which the payment for the ship was to have been made. That they were going for the payment of a debt will not alter the property; there must be something more. Even if bills of lading are delivered, that circumstance will not be sufficient, unless accompanied with an understanding that he who holds the bill of lading is to bear the risk of the goods as to the voyage, and as to the market to which they are consigned; otherwise, though the security may avail pro tanto, it cannot be held to work any change in the property."

These cases were cited by Dr. Lushington in The Ida as settling the law. In that case, claim was made by a neutral merchant to a cargo of coffee which had been consigned to him by an enemy on the credit of certain advances, as security for payment of which bills of lading covering the cargo ...


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