ERROR TO THE CIRCUIT COURT OF THE UNITED STATES FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF PENNSYLVANIA.
MR. JUSTICE GRAY, after stating the case as above, delivered the opinion of the court.
The principal defence in this case, duly made by the defendant, by formal plea, as well as by objection to the plaintiff's evidence, and sustained by the Circuit Court, was that the indenture of lease sued on was void in law, because beyond the powers of each of the corporations by and between whom it was made.
There is a preliminary question of practice, arising out of the manner in which the case was disposed of below, which is deserving of notice, although not mentioned by counsel in argument.
The Circuit Court, in ordering a non-suit because in its opinion the evidence offered by the plaintiff was insufficient in law to maintain the action, acted in accordance with the statute of Pennsylvania, which provides that "it shall be lawful for the judge presiding at the trial to order a judgment of non-suit to be entered, if in his opinion the plaintiff shall have given no such evidence as in law is sufficient to maintain the action, with leave, nevertheless, to move the court in banc to set aside such judgment of non-suit; and in case the said court in banc shall refuse to set aside the non-suit, the plaintiff may remove the record by writ of error into the Supreme Court for revision and review, in like manner and with like effect as he might remove a judgment rendered against him upon a demurrer to evidence." Penn. Stats. March 11, 1836, c. 34, § 7; March 11, 1875, c. 8; 2 Purdon's Digest (11th ed.) 1362, 1363.
Under that statute, as expounded by Chief Justice Gibson, the judge can order a non-suit, only when all the evidence introduced, with every inference of fact that a jury might draw from it in favor of the plaintiff, appears to be insufficient
in matter of law to sustain a verdict; and the defendant's motion for a non-suit is equivalent to a demurrer to evidence, differing only in the judgment thereon not being a final determination of the rights of the parties, for if it is in favor of the plaintiff the case must be submitted to the jury, and if in favor of the defendant it is no bar to a new action. Smyth v. Craig, 3 Watts & Sergeant, 14; Fleming v. Insurance Co., Brightly, 102; Bournonville v. Goodall, 10 Penn. St. 133.
It is true that a plaintiff, who appears by the record to have voluntarily become non-suit, cannot sue out a writ of error. United States v. Evans, 5 Cranch, 280; Evans v. Phillips, 4 Wheat. 73; Cossar v. Reed, 17 Q.B. 540. But in the case of a compulsory non-suit it is otherwise; and a plaintiff, against whom a judgment of non-suit has been rendered without his consent and against his objection, is entitled to relief by writ of error. Elmore v. Grymes, 1 Pet. 469; Strother v. Hutchinson, 4 Bing. N.C. 83; S.C. 5 Scott, 346; 6 Dowling, 238; Voorhees v. Coombs, 4 Vroom, 482.
There are many cases in the books, in which this court has held that a court of the United States had no power to order a non-suit without the plaintiff's acquiescence. Elmore v. Grymes, above cited; Crane v. Morris, 6 Pet. 598, 609; Silsby v. Foote, 14 How. 218; Castle v. Bullard, 23 How. 172, 183. Yet, instead of overruling, upon that ground alone, exceptions to a refusal to order a non-suit, this court, more than once, has considered and determined questions of law upon the decision of which the non-suit was refused in the court below. Crane v. Morris and Castle v. Bullard, above cited.
The difference between a motion to order a non-suit of the plaintiff and a motion to direct a verdict for the defendant is, as observed by Mr. Justice Field, delivering a recent opinion of this court, "rather a matter of form than of substance, except [that] in the case of a non-suit a new action may be brought, whereas in the case of a verdict the action is ended, unless a new trial be granted, either upon motion or upon appeal." Oscanyan v. Arms Co., 103 U.S. 261, 264.
Whether a defendant in an action at law may present in the one form or in the other, or by demurrer to the evidence,
the defence that the plaintiff, upon his own case, shows no cause of action, is a question of "practice, pleadings, and forms and modes of proceeding," as to which the courts of the United States are now required by the act of Congress of June 1, 1872, c. 255, § 5, (17 Stat. 197,) reenacted in § 914 of the Revised Statutes, to conform, as near as may be, to those existing in the courts of the State within which the trial is had. Sawin v. Kenny, 93 U.S. 289; Ex parte Boyd, 105 U.S. 647; Chateaugay Co., petitioner, 128 U.S. 544; Glenn v. Summer, 132 U.S. 152, 156.
It is doubtless within the authority of the presiding judge, and is often more convenient, in order to prevent the case from being brought up in such a form that the judgment of the court of last resort will not finally determine the rights of the parties, to adopt the course of directing a verdict for the defendant and entering judgment thereon.
But the judgment of non-suit, being a final judgment disposing of the particular case, and rendered upon a ruling in matter of law duly excepted to by the plaintiff, is subject to be reviewed in this court by writ of error.
It was therefore rightly assumed by the counsel of both parties at the argument that the only question to be determined is of the correctness of the ruling sustaining the defence of ultra vires, independently of the form in which that question was presented and disposed of.
Upon the authority and the duty of a corporation to exercise the powers granted to it by the legislature, and those only; and upon the invalidity of any contract, made beyond those powers, or providing for their disuse or alienation; there is no occasion to refer to decisions of other courts, because the judgments of this court, especially those delivered within the last twelve years by the late Mr. Justice Miller, afford satisfactory guides and ample illustrations.
The earliest case in this court, which touches the subject, is York & Maryland Railroad v. Winans, decided at December term, 1854, in which a railroad corporation unsuccessfully tried to escape liability for an unlicensed use of the plaintiff's patent in cars run over its road, upon the ground that the cars were
constructed, owned and used by another corporation under a contract with the defendant. Mr. Justice Campbell delivering judgment said: "Important franchises were conferred upon the corporation to enable it to provide the facilities to communication and intercourse, required for the public convenience. Corporate management and control over these were prescribed, and corporate responsibility for their insufficiency provided, as a remuneration to the community for their grant. The corporation cannot absolve itself from the performance of its obligations, without the consent of the legislature." 17 How. 30, 39.
In Pearce v. Madison & Indianapolis Railroad, at December term, 1858, it was adjudged that two corporation, chartered by the State of Indiana to construct and manage distinct, though connecting railroads, had no power to consolidate themselves into one corporation, or to establish a connecting steamboat line on the Ohio River, and therefore were not liable to be sued upon a promissory note which they had given in payment for a steamboat. The same justice, in delivering the opinion of the court, stated the reasons for the decision as follows: "The rights, duties and obligations of the defendants are defined in the acts of the legislature of Indiana under which they were organized, and reference must be had to these, to ascertain the validity of their contracts. They empower the defendants respectively to do all that was necessary to construct and put in operation a railroad between the cities which are named in the acts of incorporation. There was no authority of law to consolidate these corporations, and to place both under the same management, or to subject the capital of the one to answer for the liabilities of the other; and so the courts of Indiana have determined. But, in addition to that act of illegality, the managers of these corporations established a steamboat line to run in connection with the railroads, and thereby diverted their capital from the objects contemplated by their charters, and exposed it to perils for which they afforded no sanction. Now, persons dealing with the managers of a corporation must take notice of the limitations imposed upon their authority by the act of incorporation. Their
powers are conceded in consideration of the advantage the public is to receive from their discreet and intelligent employment, and the public have an interest that neither the managers nor stockholders of the corporations shall transcend their authority." 21 How. 441-443.
In Zabriskie v. Cleveland &c. Railroad, at December term, 1859, this court, again speaking by the same justice, while affirming and acting on the principle that a corporation may be bound by the conduct and representations of its directors in "those cases in which a corporation acts within the range of its general authority, but fails to comply with some formality or regulation which it should not have neglected, but which it has chosen to disregard," took the precaution to observe: "This principle does not impugn the doctrine that a corporation cannot vary from the object of its creation, and that persons dealing with a company must take notice of whatever is contained in the law of their organization. This doctrine has been constantly affirmed in this court." 23 How. 381, 398.
In Thomas v. Railroad Co., 101 U.S. 71, decided at October term, 1879, it was adjudged that a lease for twenty years by a railroad corporation of its railroad, rolling stock and franchises, in consideration of being paid one half of the gross sums collected from the operation of the road by the lessees during the term, and reserving to the lessor a right to terminate the lease and retake possession of the road at any time, paying to the lessees the value of the unexpired term, was void; and that the corporation, upon terminating the lease and resuming possession when the lessees had been in possession five years, and the accounts of the parties for those years having been adjusted and paid, was not liable to an action by the lessees to recover the value of the unexpired term; and Mr. Justice Miller, in the course of delivering judgment, said:
"The authority to make this lease is placed by counsel primarily in the following language of the thirteenth section of the company's charter: 'That it shall be lawful for the said company, at any time during the continuance of its charter, to make contracts and engagements with any other corporation,
or with individuals, for the transporting or conveying any kinds of goods, produce, merchandise, freight or passengers, and to enforce the fulfilment of such contracts.' This is no more than saying 'you may do the business of carrying goods and passengers, and may make contracts for doing that business. Such contracts you may make with any other corporation or with individuals.' No doubt a contract by which the goods, received from railroad or other carrying companies, should be carried over the road of this company, or by which goods or passengers from this road should be carried by other railroads, whether connecting immediately with them or not, are within this power, and are probably the main object of the clause. But it is impossible, under any sound rule of construction, to find in the language used a permission to sell, lease or transfer to others the entire road, and the rights and franchises of the corporation. To do so is to deprive the company of the power of making those contracts which this clause confers, and of performing the duties which it implies." 101 U.S. 80. "The authority to build a railroad and to contract for carrying passengers and goods over it and other roads is no authority to lease it, and with the lease to part with all its powers to another company or to individuals." 101 U.S. 81.
"The powers of corporations organized under legislative statutes are such, and such only, as those statutes confer. Conceding the rule applicable to all statutes, that what is fairly implied is as much granted as what is expressed, it remains, that the charter of a corporation is the measure of its powers, and that the enumeration of these powers implies the exclusion of all others." 101 U.S. 82.
"There is another principle of equal importance, and equally conclusive against the validity of this contract, which, if not coming exactly within the doctrine of ultra vires as we have just discussed it, shows very clearly that the railroad company was without the power to make such a contract. That principle is, that where a corporation, like a railroad company, has granted to it by charter a franchise intended in large measure to be exercised for the public good, the due performance of those functions being the consideration of the public grant,
any contract which disables the corporation from performing those functions, which undertakes, without the consent of the State, to transfer to others the rights and powers conferred by the charter, and to relieve the grantees of the burden which it imposes, is a violation of the contract with the State, and is void as against public policy." 101 U.S. 83.
It was also held in that case that the lease was not made valid by a subsequent act of the legislature, regulating the rates of fares and freights to be charged by "the directors, lessees or agents of said railroad;" the court saying: "It is not by such an incidental use of the word 'lessees' in an effort to make sure that all who collected fares should be bound by the law, that a contract unauthorized by the charter, and forbidden by public policy, is to be made valid and ratified by the State." 101 U.S. 85.
In Branch v. Jesup, Mr. Justice Bradley delivering judgment said: "Generally the power to sell and dispose has reference only to transactions in the ordinary course of business incident to a railroad company; and does not extend to the sale of the railroad itself, or of the franchises connected therewith. Outlying lands, not needed for railroad uses, may be sold. Machinery and other personal property may be sold. But the road and franchises are generally inalienable; and they are so, not only because they are acquired by legislative grant, or in the exercise of special authority given, for the specific purposes of the incorporating act, but because they are essential to the fulfilment of those purposes; and it would be a dereliction of the duty owed by the corporation to the State and to the public to part with them." And a lease from one railroad corporation to another was upheld in that case, only because the lessor had by its charter express authority, not only to purchase, hold and convey property, real and personal, and to connect its road with any other road, but also to incorporate its stock ...